Consenting Under Stress by Keren, Hila
Hastings Law Journal




Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_law_journal
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Hastings Law Journal by an authorized editor of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository.
Recommended Citation




Consenting Under Stress 
Hila Keren* 
This Article highlights a disturbing gap between what is currently known about stress 
across a range of disciplines and the way stress is treated at law. It does so by focusing on 
parties who seek relief from contractual obligations on the grounds that they consented 
under stress. The Article first exposes the leading legal view that stress is merely a 
subjective feeling and therefore merits no legal recognition. It then provides a pragmatic 
synthesis of the rich study of stress in order to counter that misguided legal presumption 
and to offer a better understanding of the physical, social, and psychological dimensions 
of stress. 
 
Exploring both the scientifically accepted causes of stress (stressors) and the known 
outcomes that result from stress, this Article offers a new framing of stress and a set of 
analytic tools that allow better legal access to the problem. This Article argues that legal 
actors can and should use the non-legal scientific understanding of stress to evaluate the 
arguments of those who claim to have consented to an unwanted contract while under 
stress. This Article concludes that informed evaluation of stress arguments is not only 
pragmatically necessary, but also conceptually required for any legal system that, like 
contract law, relies on the power of choice and consent. 
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Introduction: The Problem of Consenting Under Stress 
Have you ever experienced severe stress: stress that made it difficult 
to think straight and even more difficult to sleep? Stress that made you 
feel overwhelmed and perhaps depressed? If so, you understand the 
problem raised by this Article. Many of us have felt the impact of this 
kind of stress, especially in the wake of the recent economic crisis.1 But 
even if you have not yet experienced severe stress, you probably know 
what scientists have been arguing for years: Stress kills. Stress causes 
severe disease, depression, loss of memory, and rapid aging of the brain. 
It also impairs processes of decisionmaking.2 In many disciplines outside 
the law, researchers are focusing intensely on stress and its impact. They 
are investigating stress to better understand this human problem and also 
to identify interventions that could help mitigate it. In legal thought, 
however, the problem of stress is rarely noticed and even more rarely 
understood. 
One important legal context which demands awareness of stress and 
its impact is the broad sphere of contracts. Parties operating under stress 
often consent to detrimental, sometimes disastrous, agreements; they then 
ask courts to relieve them from the legal consequences, citing their 
distraught condition at the time of assent. To support their claims, they 
argue that a distressed state of mind produced a defective, even 
meaningless, “decision” to agree. Significantly, their argument invokes 
compulsion: a claim that stress left them no choice but to consent to an 
agreement that under normal conditions would have been unacceptable. 
This Article refers to this claim as “the stress argument.” 
Although contract law does not inherently prevent courts from 
attending to the problem of contractual consent produced by stress, most 
courts fail to do so. Many courts tend to dismiss the stress argument 
because they fail to understand how significantly stress can distort the 
decisionmaking process. Because those who consented to a contract under 
stress often argue that they had no choice but to agree, the stress argument 
is frequently discussed by litigants and courts under the doctrine of duress. 
However, while duress is certainly the leading defense discussed by courts, 
this framework is hardly exclusive. The stress argument is often analyzed 
 
 1. Am. Psychological Ass’n, Stress in America 5 (2010) (“As the U.S. economy continues to 
struggle for the third year, findings from the 2010 Stress in America survey paint a picture of an 
overstressed nation.”). 
 2. For fuller description, see the discussion of outcomes of stress, infra Part II. 
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under doctrines such as unconscionability or undue influence. Regardless 
of the doctrinal classification, the question is straightforward: Are there 
cases in which stress justifies legal relief? 
This Article answers this question affirmatively. It seeks to expose a 
critical lack of legal understanding of the phenomenon of stress and to 
make the normative argument that stress must be taken into account. To 
do so, the Article focuses on three contexts in which the stress argument is 
repeatedly used: (1) commercial loan agreements based on financial need, 
(2) prenuptial agreements and separation settlements, and (3) resignation 
agreements that release employers from liability. The argument that 
follows does not advocate automatic relief in every case in which a party 
has consented under stress. Humans suffer from many forms of stress, 
which differ in their intensity and in their potential to impair choice. 
Correctly understood, this Article calls for more legal awareness of the 
problem of stress and its potential to undermine contractual consent. 
Part I analyzes the legal disregard of stress in the contractual arena. It 
reveals a troubling theme: Courts tend to favor a narrow interpretation of 
the duress doctrine that fails to account for distressed voices. Within this 
narrow framework, courts too often dismiss stress arguments after 
classifying stress—without any reasoning or support—as nothing but a 
subjective feeling. As this Part demonstrates, this emotional taxonomy 
plays a major role in denying the stress a legal response. However, this 
Part also exposes a less prevalent judicial approach that responds to the 
problem of stress and is willing to offer relief to distressed parties. That 
such a “stress-sensitive” approach exists is promising, yet these cases offer 
no analysis to counter the prevailing approach that disregards stress. The 
result is a confusing and inconsistent treatment of the problem of consent 
produced under severe stress. What is missing is an account of the problem 
of stress and how and to what extent it impairs consent. 
In response to this need, Part II turns to non-legal disciplines. It 
synthesizes data regarding stress gathered from biology, sociology, 
neurosciences, and psychology. In all these fields, scholars have engaged in 
a sustained inquiry into what turns out to be one of the greatest threats to 
human health and wellness. The knowledge that has been accumulated—
which illuminates the meaning, sources, symptoms, and outcomes of 
stress—has much to offer to legal actors. This synthesis also suggests how 
those informative tools might be used to evaluate stress arguments in 
contracts cases. In short, this Part aims to highlight the magnitude of the 
problem, to counter the conventional legal argument that reduces stress 
to a subjective feeling, and to share possible standards that might be 
applied to the legal analysis of stress. 
Part III integrates the knowledge explored in Part II into the legal 
analysis of distressed consent. As a starting point, it suggests a new 
perspective that focuses more on the stressed party and the quality of her 
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consent and less on the behavior of the non-stressed party. This Part 
argues further that the doctrinal demand that a distressed party 
demonstrate lack of reasonable alternatives to consent must be revised to 
reflect the impact of stress on a decisionmaker’s ability to recognize and 
assess available alternatives. Finally, this Part proposes a four-element 
framework for articulating and evaluating stress arguments, offering 
courts and litigants the analytic tools to address the problem of consent 
under stress in a disciplined fashion. 
In conclusion, the Article does not advocate releasing all parties 
under stress from the consequences of their consent. Such a move would 
be too damaging to people’s trust in a much-needed system of contract. It 
does suggest, however, that courts recognize the meaning of stress, give 
careful attention to stress arguments, and award relief if the ability to 
consent was substantially distorted by severe and proven stress. Without 
this change, the predominant judicial approach will continue to permit 
and even reward exploitation of distress. 
This Article offers two contributions—one practical and one 
theoretical. For practitioners, it explicates the current legal treatment of 
the problem of consenting under stress and proposes new ways to 
articulate stress arguments so they are less likely to be dismissed without 
consideration. For judges, it proposes novel tools to assess the credibility 
and weight of such stress arguments. For theorists interested in contract 
law and in legal issues of consent more generally, the Article offers a 
fresh set of lenses through which the ideas of consent and fault—as well 
as the intersection of these ideas—can be reexamined. 
I.  The Inconsistent Analysis of Stress Arguments 
A. The Dominant Approach: No Relief 
Most courts do not view stress that leads a person to accept an 
injurious contract as a sufficient reason for relief from that contract. 
Parties arguing that their consent resulted from stress rather than free 
choice face two obstacles that arise from the duress doctrine. The leading 
obstacle is the doctrine’s fault requirement, which conditions relief on the 
wrongful behavior of the other party. This requirement results in a 
rejection of all arguments based on extrinsic stress that was not caused by 
the other party. The other obstacle is that relief is awarded only if the 
complaining party had no reasonable alternative to assent to the contract. 
Courts often point to alternatives that are unlikely to be available to the 
distressed parties, and they disregard the limitations that arise from their 
condition. 
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 1. The Fault Requirement 
Time and time again, courts have emphasized that to successfully use 
the defense of duress, the party seeking invalidation of a contract must 
convince the court that her dire straits were caused by the other party. 
Consequently, most courts focus not on the stressed party but rather on 
the other party. They insist that culpability, fault, wrongfulness, and 
coercion, in high doses, are necessary for the invalidation of a contract. 
Such a fault-based approach leads to a systematic refusal to help those 
severely disrupted and worn down by stress. Pressure and desperation not 
produced by the other party’s wrongful behavior have been dismissed as 
irrelevant and as inadequate to meet the legal tests of duress. This 
approach prevails even if the party demanding enforcement knew about 
the vulnerability of the distressed party and benefited from it. 
To grasp how the fault requirement leads to the dismissal of stress-
based arguments, consider a recent Sixth Circuit decision.3 Mary Ann 
Gascho worked for more than thirty years as a nurse at a hospital until 
she lost her job.4 At the time she lost her job, she signed a separation 
agreement in which she waived all her claims against her employer.5 She 
later sued the hospital claiming sexual harassment under Title VII; she 
argued that despite the release, her allegations should be entertained 
because her consent was a product of duress.6 For many years, Mary Ann 
was married to the president and CEO of the hospital, Dwight Gascho, 
with whom she had three children.7 After many years of marriage, Mary 
Ann became aware that her husband was having an affair with the vice 
president of the hospital.8 During that time, her husband abused her; one 
night, he raped her, leaving her with a split lip.9 Later, when Mary Ann 
confronted her husband’s mistress at the hospital, things became publically 
violent. Mr. Gascho, who admitted his infidelity, “grabbed her around the 
shoulders and dragged her into his office, causing bruises on her back and 
scratches on her back, arms and wrists.”10 Next, in his capacity as the 
hospital’s CEO, he fired her.11 At that point, the hospital’s Human 
Resources Director converted the discharge to a three-day suspension 
followed by a “mental health leave.”12 While on leave, the hospital’s 
officials visited Mary Ann and presented her with the separation 
 
 3. Gascho v. Scheurer Hosp., 400 F. App’x 978, 979–84 (6th Cir. 2010). 
 4. Id. at 981.  
 5.  Id. at 980. 
 6.  Id. at 981. 
 7. Gascho v. Scheurer Hosp., No. 08-10955-BC, 2009 WL 2222872, at *3 (E.D. Mich. July 23, 2009). 
 8.  Id. at *1. 
 9. Gascho, 400 F. App’x at 979–80. In another event reported in the case, he kicked her in bed, 
blaming her for “snoring like a cow.” Id. at 979. 
 10. Id. at 980. 
 11.  Id. 
 12. Id.  
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agreement, which she eventually signed. The fact that she was shaken, 
intimidated, and depressed by the entire crisis and its life-changing 
consequences was known to the hospital’s officials.13 However, despite 
offering a detailed description of Mary Ann’s distress, the court refused 
to award her relief. 
The appellate court explained that its refusal to award relief, 
notwithstanding the extreme conditions, was due to the hospital’s lack of 
fault. Mary Ann’s distress had another cause: It was mainly the fault of 
her husband.14 Accordingly, Mary Ann’s condition, regardless of its 
severity, was insufficient to undermine the validity of her consent. Her 
witnessed physical injuries,15 her abuse by her husband,16 her undisputed 
“great deal of stress,”17 her recognized “mental anguish at her husband’s 
betray[al],”18 her documented fear of her husband’s ongoing threats,19 her 
noticeable loss of weight,20 her financial and professional anxiety,21 her 
ongoing crying,22 and the acknowledged fact that at the time of signing she 
was seeing a therapist and taking both antidepressants and prescribed 
sleeping aids23—all these facts taken together were not enough to justify 
relief. Even a professional diagnosis, made only one day after the 
contract’s execution that confirmed Mary Ann’s “major depression” and 
“limited coping skills,”24 did not help. The fault requirement worked to 
block the stress argument even when no one doubted the stress or its 
severity. 
 
 13. According to the district court (but not mentioned by the appellate court), one of them 
“testified that he knew that [Mary Ann] was under a great deal of stress at the time.” Gascho, 2009 
WL 2222872, at *2. He also testified that she “was nervous and distraught and that [she] was crying,” 
adding that she “had bruises, which he was aware that she had received from Gascho.” Id. Another 
official “was also aware of [Mary Ann’s] injuries, that she was on medication, that she had lost a 
significant amount of weight, and that she was afraid of Gascho, who lived in an adjacent apartment.” Id. 
 14. Note that in deciding so the court peculiarly ignored the evident connection between the 
hospital and its chief executive, Mary Ann’s boss and husband. See Gascho, 400 F. App’x at 984 (“The 
hospital played no role in the husband’s physical misconduct, and of course had no reason to know 
about the incidents at home.”). 
 15. Gascho, 2009 WL 2222872, at *2. 
 16. Gascho, 400 F. App’x at 984. 
 17. Gascho, 2009 WL 2222872, at *2. 
 18. Gascho, 400 F. App’x at 980 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 19. According to the district court’s decision, Mary Ann’s husband threatened her many times 
throughout the period preceding the agreement. He threatened, for example, that she “could not walk 
through the hospital without an escort” and that he would “destroy her life.” Gascho, 2009 WL 
2222872, at *2–3. The record also mentions that Mary Ann was “intimidated by Gascho and fearful of 
him.” Id. at *3. 
 20. Id. at *2. 
 21. Gascho, 400 F. App’x at 980. 
 22. Gascho, 2009 WL 2222872, at *2. 
 23. Gascho, 400 F. App’x at 980. 
 24. Gascho, 2009 WL 2222872, at *3. 
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A leading case for the proposition that the duress defense necessitates 
fault is Judge Posner’s Selmer Co. v. Blakeslee-Midwest Co.25 In that case, a 
contractor refused to fully compensate a subcontractor; instead, he offered 
to settle with the subcontractor for less than the agreed-upon amount.26 
The subcontractor accepted and later sued for the difference, arguing that 
his consent emerged from a desperate financial condition that made him 
especially vulnerable to the contractors’ pressure.27 In what has since 
become the most familiar phrasing of the duress doctrine, Judge Posner 
emphasized that the fault of the defendant is required: “The mere stress 
of business conditions will not constitute duress where the defendant was 
not responsible for the conditions.”28 
But why isn’t the stress enough? In Selmer, as in Gascho, the court 
acknowledged that such stress existed and influenced the assent of the 
party seeking relief. Judge Posner recognized the dire financial state of 
the subcontractor,29 but explained that it did not matter because the other 
party, the contractor, could not “be held responsible for whatever it was 
that made [the subcontractor] so necessitous.”30 What makes Selmer so 
significant is not simply that it established a fault requirement; Selmer 
also explained why the stress of one party does not alone justify relief. 
Rationalizing the logic of the duress defense, Judge Posner wrote: 
[T]he promise is unenforceable. . . . not, as so often stated, because 
such a promise is involuntary. . . . The fundamental issue in a duress 
case is therefore not the victim’s state of mind but whether the 
statement that induced the promise is the kind of offer to deal that we 
want to discourage, and hence that we call a “threat.”31 
In other words, to Judge Posner,32 and to the many courts that follow his 
approach, the state of mind of the person under stress is never enough in 
and of itself. A contract might be involuntary and still be enforced—
exactly as shown by Gascho and many other cases.33 This part of the 
 
 25. 704 F.2d 924 (7th Cir. 1983). 
 26.  Id. at 926. 
 27.  Id. 
 28. Id. at 928 (emphasis added) (quoting Johnson, Drake & Piper, Inc. v. United States, 531 F.2d 
1037, 1042 (Ct. Cl. 1976)); see Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Linn, 671 F. Supp. 547, 560 (N.D. Ill. 1987) 
(“Defendants cannot blame [plaintiffs] for the pressures caused by defendants’ own business decisions 
and by general economic conditions.”). 
 29. Selmer, 704 F.2d at 926 (“When the job was completed, Selmer demanded payment of 
$120,000. Blakeslee-Midwest offered $67,000 and refused to budge from this offer. Selmer, because it 
was in desperate financial straits, accepted the offer.”). It is not clear from the case what made the 
subcontractor so desperate. Id. at 929. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. at 926–27 (emphasis added) (citation omitted). 
 32. Interestingly, Judge Posner has been described as a judge that “has never written an opinion 
in which he found duress available to a litigant.” See Douglas G. Baird, The Young Astronomers, 74 U. 
Chi. L. Rev. 1641, 1651 (2007). 
 33. See, e.g., Lannan v. Reno, No. 97-3170, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 3292, at *4–5 (7th Cir. Feb. 26, 
1998) (“While Lannan may have felt that the financial, personal, and medical stress in her life 
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Selmer decision stands in the way of recognizing the problem of consent 
impaired by stress. 
Further, not only is fault required in this narrow definition of duress, 
but a higher degree of fault is now required. In Gascho, recall the 
argument that the hospital was not responsible for Mary Ann’s condition. 
Now consider the fact that the hospital, as an employer of both Mary Ann 
and her husband, had let its CEO and president drag an employee along 
the hall, causing her visible bruises and much humiliation, without taking 
any measures against its harassing senior executive. Even accepting the 
problematic argument that the hospital is not responsible for the 
“personal” behavior of its own president and CEO, isn’t it clear that the 
hospital was at least partially responsible for the turmoil that eventually 
led Mary Ann to resign and sign a release form? 
The Gascho decision suggests that a stress argument may fail not 
only where stress is caused solely by extrinsic circumstances but also in 
“mixed” cases, where the stress results from a combination of some 
faulty behavior of the unstressed party and other extrinsic events. 
Indeed, as other cases further clarify, in some courts stress cannot be 
grounds for relief unless the other party was the dominant cause of it.34 
Consequently, the problem of stress is marginalized: Even severe stress 
of one party combined with some fault of the other is not sufficient. 
 2. The Reasonable Alternative Barrier 
The distraught condition of the party consenting under stress is 
further marginalized by an insensitive application of the reasonable 
 
necessitated the acceptance of the defendant’s offer of settlement, there is no evidence that the 
defendant exploited her, oppressed her, took undue advantage of her financial or personal problems, 
or otherwise wrongfully pressured her into signing the settlement agreement.”); DCR Fund I, LLC v. 
TS Family Ltd. P’ship, No. 05-6232, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 1574, at *9–12 (10th Cir. Jan. 24, 2008) 
(noting that stress coming from the wife’s illness and financial pressure was not enough because it was 
not caused by any actions of the other party). 
 34. See, e.g., Bank of Am. v. First Mut. Bancorp of Ill., Inc., No. 09 C 5108, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
65557, at *32–33 (N.D. Ill. July 1, 2010). Like in Gascho, the party seeking relief in this case was 
arguing that its consent to demanding loan terms was a product of severe pressure and desperate 
circumstances. Again, the fault requirement led to a rejection of the request for relief. Id. at *33–34. 
Yet, unlike in Gascho, the court did not ignore the possible contribution of the party seeking 
enforcement (Bank of America) to the poor condition of the party seeking relief (the borrowers). To 
the contrary, the court explicitly acknowledged at least some degree of misbehavior on the part of the 
bank, which kept lending the borrowers money, dangerously increasing their indebtedness, without 
disclosing to the borrowers the crucial fact, known to the bank, that their business partners were 
defrauding them in a manner that would eventually ruin them financially. Id. at *5–20. However, the 
recognized misbehavior of the bank was determined to be insufficient to justify relief. Engaging in an 
evaluation of the level of fault on the part of the bank and weighing it against the fault of others, the 
court seems to conclude that, since the bank’s fault was not the only or at least the dominant reason 
for the borrowers’ demise, their argument fails. The court relied on the Selmer case to make this point, 
citing the latter case as “rejecting economic duress defense where one party may have contributed to, 
but did not proximately cause, the other’s financial vulnerability.” Id. at *33. 
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alternative test. According to this test, a contract cannot be invalidated if 
the party seeking relief had a reasonable alternative other than agreeing 
to the contract in dispute. The logic of the test is that when a reasonable 
alternative exists, the decision to consent represents a meaningful choice 
and therefore should be enforced. However, when distressed parties 
argue that their stress had left them no choice, many courts respond 
unsympathetically. They tend to point out that while the stress may have 
caused a feeling of compulsion, in reality other alternatives were 
available and therefore there is no justification for relief. For example, 
consider how the court applied the reasonable alternative test in Gascho. 
There, Mary Ann argued that given her exhaustion, intimidation, 
financial anxiety, and depression, she had no choice but to consent to the 
hospital’s settlement offer. In response, the court dismissed her state of 
mind—even though evidence other than her testimony supported her 
high level of stress—and reclassified her “no-choice” as merely her 
“belief.” The court subsequently rejected that “belief” by contrasting it 
with what seemed to the court to be viable alternatives.35  
Labeling the stress-based argument a “belief” or a “feeling” 
immediately removes it from the realm of objectivity, a requirement under 
the reasonable alternative test. The gap between stress arguments and the 
objective standard is further emphasized by the many decisions that 
describe stress not simply as a feeling, but also as a “subjective” feeling.36 
Moreover, in some cases, the incompatibility is further highlighted by 
adopting the rhetoric of “subjective feeling” and then juxtaposing it to a 
description of the test that uses the term “objective.” For example, in 
Satter v. Washington State Department of Ecology the court maintained: 
“When Satter states that she suffered anxiety, depression, and an 
 
 35. Gascho v. Scheurer Hosp., 400 F. App’x 978, 983 (6th Cir. 2010) (“Gascho’s belief ‘that [she] 
had no choice’ in signing the agreement, in view of the economic benefits offered and the risk of 
economic hardship if she declined the offer, does not by itself state a claim . . . .” (alteration in 
original) (emphasis added)); see Cobb v. Potter, No. 1:05CV300, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63118, at *20–
21 (W.D.N.C. Aug. 22, 2006) (“Plaintiff contends that she was under duress and felt as if she had no 
choice but to sign the waiver . . . . [but] [p]laintiff was free to not sign the Pre-Arbitration Settlement 
Agreement . . . .”). 
 36. See, e.g., Porter v. Chi. Bd. of Educ., 981 F. Supp. 1129, 1132 (N.D. Ill. 1997) (“Plaintiff’s 
generalized expression of subjective feeling is fatally conclusory and wholly unsupported by specific 
factual averments to support a claim of duress.” (emphasis added)). Reducing the argument to a 
“subjective feeling” is far from being an incidental choice of words. Rather, as a recent study shows, it 
is the characteristic method in which courts refuse to find duress in the reality of settlements achieved 
under judicial supervision. See Nancy A. Welsh, The Thinning Vision of Self-Determination in Court-
Connected Mediation: The Inevitable Price of Institutionalism?, 6 Harv. Negot. L. Rev. 1, 76 (2011); 
see also Fed. Deposit Ins. Co. v. Ramsey, 612 F. Supp. 326, 328–29 (E.D. Tenn. 1985) (“Defendant’s 
subjective belief that he was under pressure to purchase the stock . . . is insufficient to show [economic 
duress] . . . .” (emphasis added)); Yok Hing Law v. Corral, No. A120738, 2010 WL 528478, at *10 n.2 
(Cal. Ct. App. Feb. 16, 2010) (“Plaintiff . . . does not cite to any authority for the proposition that a 
subjective feeling of intimidation is sufficient to void an otherwise valid settlement agreement.” 
(emphasis added)). 
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inability to sleep or be alone, she is speaking about things she subjectively 
felt and experienced.”37 The court then added that the legal “objective 
standard does not take into account the things Satter was subjectively 
feeling or experiencing emotionally.”38 
The conflict between the stress argument and the chosen standard is 
also reflected by the types of alternatives that courts consider as 
“reasonable.” Courts frequently point to options that require substantial 
agency and energy, significant amounts of money, well-developed 
resilience skills, and—perhaps most important—a strong drive to fight 
rather than to assent. The leading alternative that courts mention in this 
context is resisting the pressure to consent through litigation. Revealingly, 
they refer to the litigation alternative in dozens of cases as the need to 
boldly “stand pat and fight.”39 However, such an expectation ignores the 
limited capabilities of distressed people at the time of consenting. For 
parties overborne by stress, initiating, funding, and managing prolonged 
legal battles, often against people who were deeply involved in creating 
their condition, seems like an impossible mission.40 
Applying the objective/subjective dichotomy to this context while 
marking the duress test as “objective” and the stress argument as 
“subjective” is, therefore, far from a neutral stance.41 It is also important to 
note the cumulative character of these doctrinal obstacles: Since many 
courts consider duress as requiring both fault of one party and no 
reasonable alternative by the other—and since those courts also narrowly 
construe those elements—these elements often work in concert to deny 
any relief for those consenting under stress. 
B. Some Stress-Sensitive Cases 
Despite the frequent disregard of stress, some courts do take stress 
arguments into account and award relief to distressed parties. In those 
occasional cases a fundamental, albeit somewhat old, tenet of contract 
law is coming back to take center stage: meaningful consent. This tenet 
 
 37. Satter v. Wash. State Dep’t of Ecology, No. C09-5645BHS, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 80520, at 
*16 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 10, 2010) (emphasis added). 
 38. Id. at *17 (emphasis added). 
 39. See, e.g., Molsness v. City of Walla Walla, 928 P.2d 1108, 1110 (Wash. Ct. App. 1996) (“Mr. 
Molsness’ resignation is not rendered involuntary simply because he submitted it to avoid termination 
for cause, nor is it relevant that he subjectively believed he had no choice but to resign. Objectively, he 
did have a choice . . . to ‘stand pat and fight’.” (emphasis added)). A textual search for the phrase 
“stand pat and fight” has yielded at least fifty-two cases in which the phrase was used to describe a 
reasonable alternative. 
 40. See Gascho, 400 F. App’x at 984 (suggesting that Mary Ann Gascho, in her proved difficult 
condition, had several reasonable alternatives, all based on taking legal actions against her husband, 
including filing criminal charges against him, suing him in tort, or obtaining a restraining order against 
him). 
 41. Those arguments will be further developed in Part III. 
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obscures the majority’s focus on fault and reasonable alternatives. While 
judges are naming that traditional concern differently—from will to 
choice to voluntariness—they are all showing some level of care about 
the impaired state of mind created by stress. 
 1. Taking Stress into Account 
From time to time judges refuse to ignore circumstances that are 
evidently stressful. One example of judicial sensitivity to stress as 
impairing contractual consent is Holler v. Holler.42 That case follows a 
pattern in marital dissolution cases, in which brides-to-be were pressured 
by their future husbands to consent to unfair prenuptial agreements that 
deprived them of many of their marital rights. Generally, courts have 
dismissed duress arguments, made years later by the wives who had to 
face the results of their pressured, pre-wedding consent. They have refused 
to recognize the stress suffered by brides-to-be who faced the “choice” 
between signing an unfair prenuptial or a cancellation of their wedding. 
Even when the “choice” was presented to the bride just a few days before 
the wedding, courts repeatedly opined that cancelling the wedding was a 
reasonable alternative to consent.43 In Holler, however, the court found the 
stressful condition of the bride both relevant and significant. 
Natalia came to the United States to marry William Holler after the 
two of them met during his visit to the Ukraine.44 She knew very little 
English and had no income of her own, which made her fully dependent 
on William’s support.45 Before they got married, Natalia became pregnant, 
and the visa enabling her legal stay in the States was about to expire.46 
Under these circumstances, she wanted and needed to marry William to 
stay in the county, but he required her to sign a prenuptial agreement 
written in English.47 He emphasized that “she must sign the agreement if 
she wanted to be married prior to the expiration of her visa.”48 Despite her 
many efforts to translate the agreement into Russian or to read it in 
English, Natalia was neither able to completely understand the 
agreement,49 nor could she afford to hire a lawyer who would explain it to 
 
 42. 612 S.E.2d 469 (S.C. Ct. App. 2005).  
 43. The majority of courts have rejected claims of duress in such situations even when the 
agreement was presented by the husband-to-be in the very last minute, even when he threatened to 
cancel the wedding, even if the wife was pregnant, and even if she was unemployed or an immigrant. 
See, e.g., Biliouris v. Biliouris, 852 N.E.2d 687, 693 (Mass. App. Ct. 2006) (rejecting a stress argument 
of a bride who signed a prenuptial agreement two days before her wedding, due to fear of cancellation 
of the wedding, and while pregnant and crying). 
 44. Holler, 612 S.E.2d at 471. 
 45.  Id. 
 46.  Id. 
 47.  Id. 
 48. Id. at 476. 
 49. Id. at 475 (finding that Natalia could not understand the agreement). 
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her and represent her interests.50 Eventually, only eight days before the 
expiration of her visa, Natalia signed the agreement and married William 
five days later. When the couple separated years later, William argued that 
under the prenuptial agreement Natalia gave up her rights to equitable 
distribution of their marital property and for alimony. Natalia, on the other 
hand, asked for relief. Affirming a former decision of the family court, the 
court of appeal ruled for Natalia, taking into account the rare 
accumulation of circumstances that rendered her consent meaningless.51 
In another case, which stands in direct opposition to the Gascho 
decision, a female employee named Melinda Meyers prevailed where 
Mary Ann Gascho failed.52 Male senior coworkers had sexually harassed 
Meyers and, after she made efforts to resist and complain, her employer 
convinced her to resign and sign a release agreement.53 At the time of 
consent, she was completely distraught: Meyers “was in a ‘confused and 
upset’ psychological state,”54 “extremely frightened and intimidated,”55 
emotional and unable to “deal with anything,”56 and “lost control and 
broke down.”57 The court rejected her employer’s motion for summary 
judgment, explaining that after taking Meyers’ “mental state” into 
account,58 she could not be legally seen as “knowingly and voluntarily” 
agreeing to the release she signed.59 
Cases such as Holler and Meyers differ greatly from the many cases 
that disregard the problem of stress. First, they seem to focus less on the 
unstressed party and more on the party who consented under pressure. 
Then, using varying terminologies, they tend to emphasize the principle 
that a valid contract cannot be based on professed consent not 
representing a meaningful choice. For the most part, the difference 
between these two judicial outlooks may be traced to two opposite views 
of duress. While the conventional approach underscores that duress is not 
 
 50. Id. at 476 (“Wife had no money of her own with which to retain and consult an attorney or a 
translator.”). 
 51. The courts’ reasoning will be discussed in the following Section. See infra Part I.B.2. 
 52. Meyers v. Trugreen, Inc., No. 03 C 7570, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9200 (N.D. Ill. May 21, 2004). 
 53. The question of how much explicit pressure to resign was put on Melinda was left factually 
undecided by the court. According to Melinda’s affidavit she was told that if she would not resign “she 
was going to be fired and would end up with no job and no money.” Id. at *8. 
 54. Id. at *11. 
 55. Id. at *12. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. at *10. 
 59. Id. at *17. It is worth noting that in the employment context the contractual doctrines 
discussed here are often supplemented by more protective doctrines that make it somewhat easier for 
stress-sensitive courts to take stress into account. One doctrine that might be helpful for employees is 
the constructive discharge doctrine, which asks: “Did working conditions become so intolerable that a 
reasonable person in the employee’s position would have felt compelled to resign?” Pa. State Police v. 
Suders, 542 U.S. 129, 130 (2004). 
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about the state of mind of the party seeking relief,60 the stress-sensitive 
cases portray duress first and foremost as an issue of inappropriate state of 
mind. The Holler court, for example, emphasized that notion by adopting 
the following definition: Duress “is a condition of mind produced by 
improper external pressure or influence that practically destroys the free 
agency of a party and causes him to do an act or form a contract not of 
his own volition.”61 
Similarly, in Meyers, the court referred directly to stress and 
characterized duress as “the taking of undue advantage of the business or 
financial stress or extreme necessities or weaknesses of another.”62 Other 
stress-sensitive cases have highlighted the concern for the quality of 
consent of the stressed party using a variety of phrases. They concluded, 
for example, that stressful conditions may “wholly incapacitate a person 
from exercising his judgment,”63 may render the consent “involuntary,” 
and may result in no “meaningful choice.”64 Such courts have also 
concluded that more inquiry should be made into the existence of 
“meaningful ‘consent.’”65 These different expressions echo the repeated 
emphasis in Holler of the freedom of will as a leading tenet of both 
contract law and the doctrine of duress.66 
 2. The Lack of Counter-Theory 
How do those stress-sensitive courts reconcile their approach with 
the fault requirement that prevents the accommodation of stress in the 
majority of cases? Some of them avoid the doctrine of duress altogether 
and utilize alternative legal doctrines to offer people consenting under 
severe stress relief. Specifically, those courts mainly use the proximate 
 
 60. Selmer Co. v. Blakeslee-Midwest Co., 704 F.2d 924, 927 (7th Cir. 1983) (“The fundamental 
issue in a duress case is therefore not the victim’s state of mind . . . .”). 
 61. Holler v. Holler, 612 S.E.2d 469, 474 (S.C. Ct. App. 2005) (emphasis added). For an identical 
definition in a commercial setting, see Willms Trucking Co. v. JW Construction Co., 442 S.E.2d 197, 
202 (S.C. Ct. App. 1994). 
 62. Meyers v. Trugreen, Inc., No. 03 C 7570, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9200, at *17 (N.D. Ill. May 21, 
2004) (emphasis added) (citation omitted). 
 63. Odorizzi v. Bloomfield Sch. Dist., 54 Cal. Rptr. 533, 540 (Ct. App. 1966) (“It is possible that 
exhaustion and emotional turmoil may wholly incapacitate a person from exercising his judgment.”). 
 64. See In re Davis, 169 B.R. 285, 290, 304 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1994); see also In re Emery-Watson, 
412 B.R. 670, 675 (Bankr. D. Del. 2009) (“The Court finds that the Debtor had an absence of 
meaningful choices with regard to saving the Property from foreclosure at the time they contracted 
with the Defendant for its ‘sale.’” (emphasis added)). 
 65. Williams v. First Gov’t Mortg. & Investors Corp., 225 F.3d 738, 749 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (doubting 
the meaningfulness of consent of Mr. Williams who had only a sixth-grade education from the 
segregated schools of Savannah, Georgia, and who, in order to escape foreclosure, gave his consent to 
a refinancing agreement that left him with no means to get food and other necessities). 
 66. Holler, 612 S.E.2d at 475 (“The central question with respect to whether a contract was 
executed under duress is whether, considering all the surrounding circumstances, one party to the 
transaction was prevented from exercising his free will . . . . Freedom of will is essential to the validity 
of an agreement.” (citation omitted)). 
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doctrines of undue influence67 and unconscionability.68 At other times 
they avoid duress by turning to other contractual doctrines69 or, when 
available, to special statutes.70 Other stress-sensitive courts, instead of 
avoiding duress, attempt to harmonize the conventional interpretation of 
the doctrine with their own sensitivity to stress. The result, however, may 
be more confusing than harmonious. In fact, in one case the court 
described the duress doctrine as containing both the idea that stress is not 
enough unless caused by the other party, and the opposite idea that great 
stress or extreme weakness might be enough, even without the causal 
element.71 In a similar manner, the Holler court highlighted the 
significance of free will, together with the requirement of fault, as if they 
can naturally coexist.72 Only that court’s actual application of the doctrine 
reveals the stress-sensitive departure from the fault requirement.73 
One court has gone so far as to use the duress doctrine without 
reference to any fault requirement. In In re Accredited Home Lender 
Holding Co., the court used the duress doctrine to find for a stressed party 
without alluding to any fault requirement.74 Similar to some of the cases 
 
 67. For an example of using undue influence to cope with a stress problem instead of using duress, 
see, for example, Odorizzi, 54 Cal. Rptr. at 539 (“Undue influence, in the sense we are concerned with 
here, is a shorthand legal phrase used to describe persuasion which tends to be coercive in nature, 
persuasion which overcomes the will without convincing the judgment. The hallmark of such 
persuasion is high pressure, a pressure which works on mental, moral, or emotional weakness to such 
an extent that it approaches the boundaries of coercion.” (emphasis added) (citation omitted)). At 
other times, the doctrines of duress and undue influence have been used side by side. See generally 
Johnson v. Int’l Bus. Machs. Corp., 891 F. Supp. 522 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (discussing duress and undue 
influence arguments and rejecting them both). 
 68. For using unconscionability to cope with a stress problem, see, for example, Williams, 
225 F.3d 738 at 748. Mr. Williams found himself agreeing to an impossible refinancing agreement in 
fear of losing his home in a foreclosure process. Since the other party (a mortgage company) did not 
cause Mr. Williams’ financial problems, the conventional application of the duress doctrine probably 
could not have helped him. More generally, what makes unconscionability a possible home to 
distraught parties is its concern with the lack of “meaningful choice.” See Holler, 612 S.E.2d at 476 
(“Unconscionability is the absence of meaningful choice on the part of one party . . . .”). 
 69. Other doctrines that have been used are good faith and public policy. See, e.g., Williams v. 
B & K Med. Sys., Inc., 732 N.E.2d 300 (Mass. App. Ct. 2000) (good faith); Motley v. Motley, 
120 S.E.2d 422 (N.C. 1961) (public policy). 
 70. See, e.g., Blistein v. St. John’s Coll., 860 F. Supp. 256 (D. Md. 1994) (discussing a job loss case 
regarding relief from waiver since the employer did not follow the requirements of the Older Worker’s 
Benefit Protection Act). 
 71. See Reliford v. United Parcel Serv., No. 08 CV 1266, 2008 WL 4865987, at *5 (N.D. Ill. July 8, 
2008) (stating, with direct reference to Posner’s decision in Selmer, that “[w]ith respect to the party 
coerced into signing an agreement, difficult financial circumstances or a weak bargaining position are 
insufficient to establish duress, provided that the other party was not responsible for creating those 
conditions” and then adding, “[r]ather, to claim duress, a party must be under great stress or in a state 
of extreme necessity or weakness” (emphasis added) (citations omitted)). 
 72. See, e.g., Holler, 612 S.E.2d at 474–75. 
 73. In Holler the court did take into account elements of the wife’s condition that could not have 
been considered as caused by her husband, such as her limited proficiency in English and her fear of 
having to leave the United States due to the expiration of her visa. Id. at 471–76. 
 74. In re Accredited Home Lender Holding Co., 441 B.R. 443 (Bankr. D. Del. 2011). 
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already discussed,75 the context was a loan agreement signed by a stressed 
borrower. In this case, the borrower gave his consent to a problematic 
agreement under the pressure of anticipated home foreclosure and later 
asked for relief.76 In response, the lenders argued that the borrower could 
not use the duress defense because he failed to meet the two main tests of 
the doctrine: fault and reasonable alternative.77 In terms of fault, the 
lenders maintained that according to the duress doctrine, circumstances 
that they did not cause could not be part of the coercion analysis.78 In 
terms of reasonable alternatives, the lenders contended that the borrower 
had an alternative to consenting: “[H]e could have defended the 
foreclosure action.”79 This structure of argument would have certainly 
worked under the conventional interpretation of the duress doctrine. 
However, the court decided to award the borrower relief under the 
duress defense; it did so by focusing on the borrower’s condition. The 
court noted that at the time of consenting, the borrower was facing a loss 
of his home, was not represented by a lawyer, and “was under the care of 
a physician for post traumatic stress syndrome.”80 Significantly, the court 
disregarded the lenders’ no-fault arguments.81 
Whatever the analytic framework chosen by the few stress-
sensitive courts has been, no framework has never directly and 
explicitly recognized stress alone as a ground for relief. These stress-
sensitive cases are so few in number and use such different methods in 
responding to the stress argument that general rules are difficult to 
synthesize and destined to be imprecise. However, in each of the stress-
sensitive decisions, the court intuited two underlying principles, even if 
it did not emphasize them. First, stress can be a serious and 
demonstrable condition that might truly impair consent and, as such, 
deserves judicial attention: This differs starkly from classifying stress as 
merely a subjective feeling. Second, consenting under stress justifies 
relief because it stands in conflict with the contractual ideals of volition, 
free agency, and meaningful choice: This assumption counters the fault 
 
 75. See generally Bank of Am. v. First Mut. Bancorp of Ill., Inc., No. 09 C 5108, 2010 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 65557 (N.D. Ill. 2010); Williams v. First Gov’t Mortg. & Investors Corp., 225 F.3d 738 (D.C. 
Cir. 2000). 
 76. Accredited Home Lender Holding Co., 441 B.R. at 444–45. 
 77. Id. at 447 (“The Debtors argue that the circumstances giving rise to the Forbearance 
Agreement were not coercive. They assert that they acted within their legal rights as set forth in the 
Mortgage by commencing the foreclosure action. They contend that Mr. Smalls had an alternative to 
signing the Forbearance Agreement: he could have defended the foreclosure action.”). 
 78. Id. (citing McLaughlin v. State Dep’t of Natural Res., 526 So. 2d 934, 936 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
1988) (holding that to prove duress a party must show “(1) that one side involuntarily accepted the terms 
of another, (2) that circumstances permitted no other alternative, and (3) that said circumstances were the 
result of coercive acts of the opposite party” (emphasis added))). 
 79. Id. at 447. 
 80. Id. 
 81.  Id. at 447–48. 
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requirement. While the goal of this Part has been to analyze the legal 
confusion with regard to the problem of consenting under stress, the goal 
of the next two Parts is to argue the importance of those two intuitions.82 
Accordingly, the next Part focuses on the first intuition and on the actual 
meaning of stress, suggesting scientific foundation for the serious concern 
of stress-sensitive courts.83 
II.  Understanding Stress 
A. The Study of Stress 
Stress is not merely a subjective feeling. The reason so many 
disciplines are interested in researching stress is the growing awareness of 
its bitter consequences to individuals and their health and well-being, to 
families and their cohesion, to communities and their strength, and to 
society at large.84 Works in biomedicine, psychology, neuroscience, 
sociology, and education all point—through diverse methods and different 
theories—to one conclusion: While some stress can be valuable or at least 
tolerable, prolonged, high levels of stress produce a negative impact on 
human beings’ lives. This damaging aspect of stress—to physical health, to 
mental condition, to cognitive functioning, and to a combination thereof—
has been motivating the study of stress for several decades.85 Beyond 
concluding that stress is damaging, however, the study of stress is 
sprawling and at least one stress scholar has gone as far as to call this 
 
 82. To clarify: Smoothing out the differences between these cases and resolving doctrinal 
incoherence are not among of the goals of this Article. 
 83. Part III will engage with the second intuition regarding the importance of quality of consent. 
 84. There are numerous statistics of the impact of stress in the United States. See, e.g., Henry L. 
Thompson, The Stress Effect: Why Smart Leaders Make Dumb Decisions—And What to Do 
About It 112 (2010) (“[I]n the United States, stress costs industry an estimated $300 billion a year. . . . 
It is also linked to the six leading causes of death in the United States: heart disease, cancer, lung 
ailments, accidents, cirrhosis of the liver, and suicide. . . . [M]ore than 200 million people take 
medication related to controlling stress.”). 
 85. For a concise description of the development of the scientific study of stress, see David C. 
Glass, Foreword, in The Handbook of Stress Science: Biology, Psychology, and Health xvii 
(Richard J. Constrada & Andrew Baum eds., 2011). Many mention the seminal work of the Viennese 
endocrinologist Hans Selye and his 1956 book The Stress of Life as marking the beginning of the 
modern focus on the problem of stress as an identifiable subject. See id. at xvii; see also Am. Inst. of 
Stress, General Information Brochure (2012) (“Stress has become such an ingrained part of our 
vocabulary and daily existence, that it is difficult to believe that our current use of the term originated 
only a little more than 50 years ago, when it was essentially ‘coined’ by Hans Selye.”). By 1975 the 
issue was further acknowledged by the foundation of the Journal of Human Stress, and in 1978 the 
American Institute of Stress was formally established as an educational organization designed to serve 
as a clearing house for information on all stress-related topics. Id. Importantly, much of the empirical 
work and some of the theoretical work was implemented and funded by the U.S. Army with special 
emphasis—relevant to our focus—on decisionmaking under stress. See, e.g., Kenneth R. Hammond, 
Judgments Under Stress (2000). 
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body of work “internally incommensurable.”86 At the same time, efforts to 
establish an interdisciplinary discourse of stress are flourishing,87 and 
scholars seem to share a belief in the inability to capture the phenomenon 
of stress under one leading discipline, as it is never merely psychological, 
purely physical, or solely sociological. 
The following synthesis of the study of stress is a pragmatic response 
to these challenges, a “useful synthesis”88 especially tailored for legal actors 
who wonder how legal analysis can take stress into account. As I have 
shown in Part I, the main resistance to arguments based on stress comes 
from the notion that stress is so personal and emotional that it cannot be 
assessed, proven, analyzed, and incorporated into a legal discourse. 
Therefore, my goal is to offer an analysis of stress that explains its patterns, 
enabling practitioners to structure stress arguments and assisting courts to 
evaluate them. In creating a general framework, I found it most helpful to 
draw on the Stress Process model, which was created in the 1980s by 
sociologist Leonard Pearlin, and which inspired numerous works on 
stress.89 According to this model, exposure to stressors that exceed one’s 
ability to cope with them creates the condition of stress, sometimes called 
distress or a stress response.90 Despite working under this sociological 
structure, my analysis includes other findings about stress that come from 
disciplines that do not necessarily share a sociological outlook. For 
example, scientists interested in the impact of stress on the cardiovascular 
system may care less about the causes of stress, whereas those causes are at 
the core of the sociological approach. Scientists may care more about the 
exact hormones released by the stressed brain, data which in turn may be 
less significant to sociologists. 
The legal perspective, however, necessitates attention to both causes 
and outcomes, which may be crucial to courts’ abilities to evaluate the 
credibility of the stress argument and to decide what legal meaning should 
be assigned to it. Therefore, the following exploration of the study of stress 
is divided into two Subparts. The first is focused on stressors and suggests 
information relevant to assessing plausibility of stress arguments. The 
 
 86. Hammond, supra note 85, at vii. 
 87. See, e.g., Handbook of Stress Science, supra note 85. 
 88. Kathryn A. Abrams & Hila Keren, Who’s Afraid of Law and the Emotions?, 94 Minn. L. Rev. 
1997, 2048 (2010) (defining “useful synthesis”: “A ‘useful synthesis’ will sort and arrange the nonlegal 
knowledge in a manner which responds to the context and legal questions at hand. This means that 
some important theories or data will be purposefully omitted, while other facts and theories may be 
emphasized beyond their relative weight outside of law.”). 
 89. The leading article, which since its publication has inspired many other works, is Leonard I. 
Pearlin, The Sociological Study of Stress, 30 J. Health & Soc. Behav. 241 (1989). What is known as 
Pearlin’s Stress Process has inspired much study of stress using his model and understanding. See, e.g., 
Advances in the Conceptualization of the Stress Process: Essays in Honor of Leonard I. 
Pearlin (William R. Avison et al. eds., 2010) [hereinafter Advances]. 
 90.  Pearlin, supra note 89, at 254. 
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second concerns the outcomes of stress, offering tools to recognize known 
symptoms of stress that can further assist the plausibility evaluation. This 
Subpart also explains the powerful impact of stress on behavior and 
decisionmaking. 
B. Common Stressors 
Earthquake, financial crisis, death of a loved one, work overload, 
car accident, divorce, and incapacitating illness, to name a few, are all 
negative experiences that can be highly challenging to humans’ well-
being. Most people experiencing events or situations of these kinds are 
deeply affected by them, and thus those circumstances may be 
considered as “normatively stressful.”91 Conditions that typically cause 
stress are also known in the literature as “stressors,” that is, the stimuli 
that cause stress.92 The evolution of the “stressor” terminology to connect 
dissimilar human experiences has been the principal accomplishment of 
the pioneering stress research and a chief facilitator of the study of stress. 
Efforts to create a taxonomy of stressors followed. Scientists observed 
that stressors come in many shapes and forms. Some, like an injury, are 
“acute” and short-term, while others, such as unemployment, may be 
“chronic” and persist over a long period of time.93 Some are shared by 
many, like war, while others, such as illness or bereavement, are more 
individually experienced.94 Many stressors are inescapable, like a 
hurricane, for example, while others may involve some level of choice, 
such as pursuing a divorce. Despite those distinct categories, the study of 
stress has shown that very different stressors can cause similar negative 
results to the physical, mental, and psychological well-being of 
individuals.95 It is this quality of stressors that has brought some 
researchers to declare that stressors are “objective,”96 emerging from 
verifiable characteristics of the environment and causing similar results. 
And indeed, while some stressors might affect people differently, certain 
stressors, such as the death of a loved one, are so noxious that almost 
every person affected experiences a similar stress. This observation, 
although quite elementary in the study of stress, appears quite significant 
to law. If bereavement, for example, is a stressor for nearly everyone, then 
a stress argument coming from a grieving person can be presumed to be 
fairly credible. Accordingly, cataloguing stressors that have a universal 
 
 91. Richard S. Lazarus & Susan Folkman, Stress, Appraisal, and Coping 14 (1984). 
 92. The term was coined by Selye and is used by most stress theorists. See Am. Inst. of Stress, 
supra note 85. 
 93.  Lazarus & Folkman, supra note 91, at 14. 
 94.  See id. 
 95.  See Naomi Breslau & Ronald C. Kessler, The Stressor Criterion in DSM-IV Posttraumatic 
Stress Disorder: An Empirical Investigation, 50 Biological Psychiatry 699, 699 (2001). 
 96.  Id. 
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effect may render the prima facie stress argument plausible. The study of 
stress does just this: It has produced inventories of common stressors that 
originate in traumatic experiences (such as rape), life-changing events 
(such as divorce), and chronic conditions (such as poverty). 
 1. Traumatic Stressors 
Following the Vietnam War the American Psychiatric Association 
officially added Posttraumatic Stress Disorder (“PTSD”) to its Diagnostic 
Manual of Mental Disorders (“DSM”).97 Setting standards for diagnosing 
the newly acknowledged disorder, the DSM defined the first criterion as 
an exposure to a “traumatic stressor.”98 The original purpose of this 
“stressor criterion” was to identify traumatic stressors that do not depend 
on the victim’s individual reaction to events, but rather on a clinical 
evaluation of what would have been stressful for an imagined “average” 
person.99 Importantly, creating a stressor criterion in the DSM has 
spurred various checklists of potential traumatic stressors.100 For 
example, the Life Events Checklist (“LEC”) is a seventeen-item list of 
events that is often used by psychiatrists applying the stressor criterion.101 
The LEC’s stressors are as follows: 
(1)  Natural disaster (for example, flood, hurricane, tornado, 
earthquake) 
(2)   Fire or explosion 
(3)  Transportation accident (for example, car accident, boat accident, 
train wreck, plane crash) 
(4)   Serious accident at work, home, or during recreational activity 
(5)  Exposure to toxic substance (for example, dangerous chemicals, 
radiation) 
 
 97. See Am. Psychiatric Ass’n, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 236 
(3d ed. 1980). 
 98. Richard J. McNally, Conceptual Problems with the DSM-IV Criteria for Posttraumatic Stress 
Disorder, in Posttraumatic Stress Disorder: Issues and Controversies 1, 1–2 (Gerald M. Rosen ed., 
2004) (offering a chronology of the DSM’s approach to PTSD). 
 99. Breslau & Kessler, supra note 95, at 699. Although this initial “objective” approach was later 
supplemented by a subjective criterion, the diagnostic work still starts from a search for a traumatic 
event. See Am. Psychiatric Ass’n, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 463–64 
(4th ed., Text Revision, 2000) (“Traumatic events . . . include, but are not limited to, military combat, 
violent personal attack (sexual assault, physical attack, robbery, mugging), being kidnapped, being taken 
hostage, terrorist attack, torture, incarceration as a prisoner of war or in a concentration camp, natural 
or manmade disasters, severe automobile accidents, or being diagnosed with a life-threatening illness.”). 
 100. For a compressive description of many of those measuring instruments, see Suzan M. Orsillo, 
Measures for Acute Stress Disorder and Posttraumatic Stress Disorder, in Practitioner’s Guide to 
Empirically Based Measures of Anxiety 255 (Martin M. Antony et al. eds., 2001); see also Naomi 
Breslau et al., Trauma and Posttraumatic Stress Disorder in the Community, 55 Archives Gen. 
Psychiatry 626, 629 tbl.2 (1998); Breslau & Kessler, supra note 95, at 701 tbl.1 (both using empirically 
a nineteen-item list that is based on the DSM’s stressor criterion). 
 101. Although the LEC’s list may seem lengthy, its importance to our topic—and more generally 
the importance of similar inventories of traumatic stressors—seems to justify its inclusion here. 
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(6)  Physical assault (for example, being attacked, hit, slapped, kicked, 
beaten up) 
(7)  Assault with a weapon (for example, being shot, stabbed, 
threatened with a knife, gun, bomb) 
(8)  Sexual assault (rape, attempted rape, made to perform any type of 
sexual act through force or threat of harm) 
(9)  Other unwanted or uncomfortable sexual experience 
(10) Combat or exposure to a war-zone (in the military or as a civilian) 
(11) Captivity (for example, being kidnapped, abducted, held hostage, 
prisoner of war) 
(12) Life-threatening illness or injury 
(13) Severe human suffering 
(14) [Witnessing] [s]udden, violent death (for example, homicide; 
suicide) 
(15) Sudden, unexpected death of someone close to you 
(16) Serious injury, harm, or death you caused to someone else 
(17) Any other stressful event or experience102 
Inventories of traumatic stressors, such as the LEC, can serve as a 
professional and reliable resource to assist in the evaluation of stress 
arguments, because they include stressors that have been professionally 
recognized as predicting a stress disorder. Compare, as a brief example, 
the stressors of Mary Ann Gascho, who was raped and beaten by her 
then-husband,103 with the acknowledgment that sexual assaults (number 8 
on the LEC inventory) and physical assaults (number 6) are traumatic 
stressors. 
A possible addition to inventories such as the LEC are stressors that 
do not clearly meet the current threshold of the stressors criterion, but 
are still severe enough to raise arguments in support of their inclusion. 
PTSD’s theorists have argued, for example, that beyond the recognized 
traumatic events, room should be made in the inventories for the 
cumulative stress that occurs in cases such as repeated harassment at work 
or prolonged care for a terminally ill partner.104 Although such 
recommendations have yet to be accepted, even stressors that potentially 
result in PTSD can be evaluated as normative and universal stressors in 
the context of stress arguments. 
 
 102. Matt J. Gray et al., Psychometric Properties of the Life Events Checklist, 11 Assessment 330, 
339 (2004). 
 103. Gascho v. Scheurer Hosp., 400 F. App’x 978, 979–84 (6th Cir. 2010). 
 104. See, e.g., Chris R. Brewin et al., Reformulating PTSD for DSM-V: Life After Criterion A, 22 J. 
Traumatic Stress 366, 368 (2009). But cf. Robert J. McNally, Progress and Controversy in the Study of 
Posttraumatic Stress Disorder, 54 Ann. Rev. Psychol. 229, 231–32 (2003) (warning against a 
conceptual bracket creep in the definition of trauma). 
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 2. Life Events as Stressors 
Stress theorists have shown widespread interest in the properties of 
events that make them stressful. Major life events, such as divorce or 
being fired, have been recognized as universally stressful. Throughout 
the second half of the twentieth century, researchers dedicated much 
effort to identifying those life events and assessing their relative weight 
as stressors. Such evaluation of events was mainly based on the amount 
of readjustment individuals were required to do, the events’ desirability, 
the stressors’ foreseeability, and the individuals’ ability to control their 
occurrence.105 One pioneering tool of measurement was the Social 
Readjustment Rating Scale (“SRRS”).106 The original SRRS listed forty-
three such events and rated them by assigning numbers (called “life-
change units”)—ranging from 100 (death of spouse) to 11 (minor 
violations of the law)—to each of them.107 
Crucial to the legal discussion of consenting under stress is realizing 
that in the cases discussed earlier, the events that triggered the individuals’ 
stress arguments are ranked as significant stressors under the SRRS. For 
example: Divorce is ranked second (out of forty-three) on the list and 
assigned seventy-three life-change units; marriage is ranked seventh and 
is assigned fifty units; being “fired at work” is the eighth event on the list 
with forty-seven units; pregnancy is twelfth (forty units); and “change in 
financial state” is sixteenth with thirty-eight units.108 Such a checklist 
method is based on the idea that major changes in life can be measured 
in an objective manner.109 Moreover, central to the SRRS’s measurement 
of stress level is the idea that stressors accumulate. For example, if 
someone who is going through a divorce also loses her job and 
consequently suffers financial troubles due to the two events—similar to 
the facts of Gascho110—the units are cumulative and add up to a total of 
158 life-change units to best capture the possible magnitude of their joint 
impact. Although aspects of the SRRS were criticized by some stress 
researchers,111 others relied on it and further refined it.112 Despite the lack 
 
 105. See generally Thomas H. Holmes & Richard H. Rahe, The Social Readjustment Rating Scale, 
11 J. Psychosomatic Res. 213, 216 tbl.3 (1967). 
 106.  See id.; see also Sheldon Cohen et al., Strategies for Measuring Stress in Studies of Psychiatric 
and Physical Disorders, in Measuring Stress: A Guide for Health and Social Scientists 3, 3 
(Sheldon Cohen et al. eds., 1995) [hereinafter Measuring Stress] (explaining that the SRRS belongs 
with the environmental approach to the study of stress, which focuses on assessment of external events 
or experiences that are “normatively (objectively) associated with substantial adaptive demands”). 
 107.  Holmes & Rahe, supra note 105, at 216 tbl.3. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Barbara Anderson et al., Interview Assessment of Stressor Exposure, in Handbook of Stress 
Science, supra note 85, at 565, 566. 
 110. Gascho v. Scheurer Hosp., 400 F. App’x 978, 980 (6th Cir. 2010). 
 111. See Cohen et al., supra note 106, at 5–6; see also R. Jay Turner & Blair Wheaton, Checklist 
Measurement of Stressful Life Events, in Measuring Stress, supra note 106, at 36–37. 
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of a universally agreed-upon list of stressors,113 the checklist methods of 
measuring stress are still “the dominant research procedure” used in 
thousands of empirical studies of exposure to stressors.114 
The value of the flourishing study of stressful life events in general,115 
and of the use of life event inventories in particular, to our topic seems 
straightforward. It offers a well-researched—and empirically tested—list of 
stressors and a relatively practical way to evaluate the credibility of any 
given stress argument. 
 3. Chronic Stressors 
In addition to short-term events, some enduring conditions produce 
high levels of stress. Stressors in this group are chronic, and they put 
humans under special demands that may lead not only to distress but also 
to an exhaustion of resources that—in a vicious circle—causes greater 
subsequent vulnerability to other stressors.116 As opposed to the life 
events discussed above, the challenge here results not so much from the 
need to adapt to changes, it stems from the ongoing requirement of 
coping with difficult unchanging realities coming from poverty, 
continuous unemployment, persistent financial worries, marital troubles, 
disability, loneliness, and others. Chronic stressors are different from life-
events stressors in the way they start, persist, and end. Specifically, they 
don’t necessarily begin at a discrete moment, but rather may exist as a 
“state” or develop insidiously as a problematic, continuing condition in 
the social environment.117 They often persist for a long time, with 
 
 112. Such, for instance, was the 1977 study by Mardi Horowitz and his colleagues who created the 
Life Events Questionnaires for measuring what they called “presumptive stress.” Mardi Horowitz et 
al., Life Event Questionnaires for Measuring Presumptive Stress, 39 Psychosomatic Med. 413, 413 
(1977). The SRRS itself was updated in 1997. See generally Mark A. Miller & Richard H. Rahe, Life 
Changes Scaling for the 1990’s, 43 J. Psychosomatic Res. 279 (1997) (reporting updated findings with 
regard to the original forty-three life change events from 1965, adding data from 1977 and 1995). With 
the permission of the authors of the SRRS, everybody can now test and measure their stress level by 
taking a simple (but telling) online test. See Life Change Stress Test, WebMD (May 18, 2011), 
http://www.webmd.com/balance/stress-management/life-change-stress-test. 
 113. See Anderson et al., supra note 109, at 566. 
 114. Id. (explaining that checklists are used as either a stand-alone approach or combined with a 
follow-up interview and maintaining that their popularity “appears to lie in the intuitive appeal of the 
stress concept, the assumption that ‘more events are worse’ and the efficiency and economy of the 
method”); see Pearlin, supra note 89, at 245 (describing life events inventories as an “inviting research 
tool”). 
 115. Caroline Aldwin, Stress and Coping Across the Lifespan, in The Oxford Handbook of 
Stress, Health and Coping 15, 18 (Suzan Folkman ed., 2010) (“Life events are most commonly 
studied . . . .”). 
 116. Stephen J. Lepore, Measurement of Chronic Stressors, in Measuring Stress, supra note 106, 
at 102. 
 117. Blair Wheaton, The Nature of Chronic Stress, in Coping with Chronic Stress 43, 53 
(Benjamin H. Gottlieb ed., 1997). 
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fluctuating intensity, sometimes cutting through different phases of life.118 
And, unlike life events, they usually do not come to a defined end. In 
fact, while some chronic strains may gradually dissipate, others, such as 
living in a dangerous neighborhood or suffering from discrimination, may 
influence individuals from birth to death.119 
Due to all those characteristics of chronic stressors, the task of 
organizing them in inventories and measuring their impact is a challenging 
one.120 Yet as with life events, a universal aspect may be found in many of 
the chronic stressors. Most people will find stressful, for example, 
constantly lacking the money to pay the rent or mortgage, or facing 
frequent conflicts with their spouse or their boss. In an effort to delineate 
some standardization, stress theorists have found it useful to focus on 
chronic strains that typically arise within the contexts of “major social 
roles,” such as work, marriage, and parenthood.121 Difficulties at work, 
problems with a spouse, and worries about kids are all significant chronic 
stressors, according to this understanding, because of the way people are 
invested—physically and psychologically—in their social roles. As a 
result, inventories of chronic stressors tend to focus on strains at work 
and within the family context.122 
Exploring patterns in inventories of chronic stressors appears 
valuable to the ability to assess the reasonability and credibility of stress 
arguments. Applying the social role idea, many people tend to share high 
levels of stress that arise from some of the following: (1) overload in 
fulfilling their role (be it at work or at home),123 (2) interpersonal conflicts 
within their role (such as with their supervisor or their spouse),124 
(3) conflicts between roles (working parents are the prime example),125 
(4) unwanted roles (such as in the case of homemakers who would rather 
have outside employment),126 (5) unachievable roles (inability to get a 
job, to find a spouse, or to have children as leading examples),127 and 
 
 118.  Id. 
 119.  See id. at 69–71 (appendix). 
 120. See Pearlin, supra note 89, at 245 (describing the problem and suggesting focusing on those 
chronic stressors that occur within roles); see also Lepore, supra note 116, at 106 (pointing to the 
problem and reviewing available measuring instruments). 
 121. See, e.g., Pearlin, supra note 89, at 245. 
 122. Examples in the work context include the Work Environment Scale, the Occupational Stress 
Inventory, and the Job Content Questionnaire. Examples in the marital/familial context include the 
Family Environment Scale, the Marital Situations Inventory, and the Marital Agendas Protocol. See 
Lepore, supra note 116, at 105–06. 
 123. Pearlin, supra note 89, at 245. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. (naming this category “role captivity”). 
 127. Wheaton, supra note 117, at 56–57 (underscoring the importance of not having a major social 
role without including it in the role-oriented stressors). I believe that emphasizing the frustration of 
not being able to achieve a desired role better explains the connection to stress. 
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(6) loss of role (with examples that range from having to retire from 
work to coping with empty nest after the children have left the home).128 
To this role-oriented inventory of chronic stressors, other scholars have 
added more “general” strains, which cut across roles, such as residing in a 
dangerous area, living in an air-polluted environment, or suffering from a 
severe illness.129 Stress theorist Blair Wheaton, for example, has created a 
sixty-item inventory that includes both role-related and more general 
chronic stressors.130 That inventory can be quite useful to legal 
practitioners, judges, and legal theorists. 
An instructive case can be that of Mr. Williams, who lived in 
poverty his entire life, suffered from never-ending financial troubles and 
found himself unable to feed his children or pay the bills when he agreed 
to a problematic loan agreement.131 Realizing that Wheaton’s accepted 
measuring instrument includes potential chronic stressors such as you 
“don’t have the money to buy the things you or your kids need” and your 
“rent or mortgage is too much”132 could have been helpful in assessing 
Mr. Williams’s stress argument regarding his condition and his inability 
to give meaningful consent. 
C. Individual and Social Differences Explained 
Thus far we have portrayed a relatively objective picture of stressors 
without differentiating between individuals. However, even major 
stressors are not always consistent in the effects that they produce. What is 
it that changes the influence that similar stressors have over individuals? 
For the most part, such differences can be explained and analyzed. 
Contrary to the leading legal view, they do not demonstrate that stress is a 
subjective phenomenon that is random in its impact on individuals. 
 1. Individual Differences 
Richard Lazarus’s celebrated “appraisal theory of stress” explains 
differences in individuals’ response to stressors and can offer salient 
guidance.133 As distinct from the above effort to universalize stressors, 
which is sometimes termed “the environmental approach,”134 the appraisal 
theory emphasizes that for most stressors what is highly stressful for some 
may not be as stressful for others.135 The differences between individuals 
 
 128. Pearlin, supra note 89, at 245–46 (naming this category “role restructuring”). I believe that 
emphasizing the loss in the changing role better explains the connection to stress. 
 129. Wheaton, supra note 117, at 69–71 (appendix).  
 130.  Id. 
 131. See Williams v. First Gov’t Mortg. & Investors Corp., 225 F.3d 738, 749 (D.C. Cir. 2000). 
 132. Wheaton, supra note 117, at 69 (appendix).  
 133. Lazarus & Folkman, supra note 91. 
 134. See supra note 106. 
 135. Lazarus & Folkman, supra note 91, at 19. 
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are explained by their personal appraisal of the stressfulness of a given 
situation. Thus, in their seminal 1984 book Stress Appraisal and Coping, 
Lazarus and Folkman define stress not as an event but as “a relationship 
between the person and the environment that is appraised by the person 
as taxing or exceeding his or her resources and endangering his or her 
well-being.”136 
The personal appraisal process is not, however, as capricious, erratic, 
or unreliable as envisioned by some legal actors. It is a rich cognitive 
categorization practice that Lazarus and other scholars have carefully 
delineated in years of research. Their study focuses on two separate 
evaluations: an appraisal of the significance of the stressor for the concrete 
individual, followed by an appraisal of the resources available to that 
individual to cope with what is assessed to be stressful.137 They show that 
those “personal” appraisals follow recognizable patterns that can be 
explained and that allow for intelligent investigation and analysis.138 
a. Appraisal of Significance 
Appraising the significance of stressors depends on both personal 
and situational factors. On the personal level, the appraisal depends on 
the relative importance of the stressful matter in one’s life, and this 
importance depends on a concrete set of commitments and beliefs. As 
conceptualized by Lazarus and Folkman, the “deeper a person’s 
commitment, the greater the potential threat or harm.”139 Accordingly, 
perceiving a matter as salient to their well-being tends to make people 
particularly vulnerable to stress related to that matter.140 This principal of 
relative significance can be very constructive in evaluating stress 
arguments in legal cases. For example, a person losing her home due to 
foreclosure141 or losing a job of thirty-five years142 is probably experiencing 
her loss as larger than the loss of a real estate investment that has only 
monetary value or a temporary job. Fortunately, the concrete significance 
of a stressor in one’s life does not require mindreading skills, but only 
willingness to analyze the particularities with special awareness to the 
linkage between significance and stress. 
 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. at 31–37. In 1984, Lazarus and Folkman decided to pragmatically continue using the 
terminology of “Primary Appraisal” (for appraisal of significance) and “Secondary Appraisal” (for 
appraisal of resources), despite their own dissatisfaction with such terminology. See id. at 31 
(explaining the authors’ doubts). Therefore, I use different terminology: “Appraisal of Significance” 
for their “Primary Appraisal” and “Appraisal of Resources” for their “Secondary Appraisal.” 
 138.  Id. 
 139. Id. at 58. 
 140. Id. at 58–59. 
 141. See, e.g., In re Accredited Home Lender Holding Co., 441 B.R. 443 (2011). 
 142. See, e.g., Gascho v. Scheurer Hosp., 400 F. App’x 978 (6th Cir. 2010). 
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Beyond the question of what is at stake personally, there are common 
situational factors that can create differences in the appraisal of stressors. 
It should be noted that these situational factors are all matters of fact—as 
opposed to internal feelings—and therefore they lend themselves to legal 
analysis and assessment. Many times the special weight of a stressor can be 
explained not by personality factors, but rather by the phenomenon of 
“clustering of stressors.”143 To fully appreciate the weight of stressors on 
the individual, decisionmakers must bear in mind how stressors 
accumulate, converge, and proliferate.144 Sometimes several stressors exist 
independently of one another, but still have a cumulative effect. Consider, 
for example, being exposed to a natural disaster while being unemployed. 
Frequently, however, the stressors are strongly linked to each other, and 
several “primary stressors” lead to “secondary stressors.”145 For example, a 
loss of job can engender financial strains which may create or enhance 
marital conflicts that can end in a divorce—generating a great sense of 
loneliness and a new set of financial strains. As even this simplified 
example illustrates, occasionally the primary stressors are less acute than 
their consequential stressors, as the problem of stress tends to escalate 
over time. Moreover, stressors typically cross over individuals. Thus, your 
exposure to stress may be enhanced by exposure to stressors impacting 
people close to you.146 An example, taken from a case in which the court 
rejected the stress argument, is where a borrower’s ongoing financial 
strains were intensified by his wife’s illness: Her stress spilled over and 
enhanced the stress in his life.147 
Additionally, time-related situational factors often play a role in the 
individual appraisal of stress.148 First, the imminence of a stressful event 
or situation matters. While surprising negative changes may be stressful, 
studies show that the anticipation period before the stress begins tends to 
enhance the stressfulness by adding the weight of anxiety and worries to 
the initial meaning of the nearing stressor. In those studies, the level of 
stress appeared to reach its peak when “there was enough time for 
subjects to grasp the significance of the threat, but not enough time to 
 
 143. Pearlin, supra note 89, at 248. 
 144. See Lazarus & Folkman, supra note 91, at 113 (explaining that the situation should “be 
considered in the context of the person’s overall functioning, and in relation to what else is going on in 
the person’s life”); see also Pearlin, supra note 89, at 247. 
 145. Pearlin, supra note 89, at 248. 
 146. See, e.g., Melissa A. Milkie, The Stress Process Model: Some Family-Level Considerations, in 
Advances, supra note 89, at 93, 96 (giving the example of a stress transfer of an ill family member 
whose situation inflicts stress on other family members); see also Nicole E. Roberts & Robert W. 
Levenson, The Remains of the Workday: Impact of Job Stress and Exhaustion on Marital Interaction in 
Police Couples, 63 J. Marriage & Family 1052, 1052 (2001) (“[J]ob stress and exhaustion can 
negatively impact marriage.”). 
 147. DCR Fund I, LLC v. TS Family Ltd. P’ship, 261 F. App’x 139, 143 (10th Cir. 2008). 
 148. Lazarus & Folkman, supra note 91, at 92 (“[T]ime may be one of the most important 
parameters of stressful situations, yet it has been one of the most neglected areas in stress research.”). 
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generate effective coping strategies.”149 Second, the duration of the 
stressful situation makes a difference, as suggested more generally by the 
study of chronic stressors. When a stressful situation persists over time, 
as in the case of ongoing financial strains, it is more likely to “wear the 
person down psychologically and physically.”150 Third, uncertainty or 
ambiguity about the nature of a threat, whether it will happen, and what 
might be done about it, may also add to the potential stress in a given 
situation.151 It can increase the level of threat by limiting the individual’s 
sense of control and by intensifying the sense of helplessness, adding a 
layer of anxiety that is often associated with uncertainty. Awareness of 
this last point may help, for example, in evaluating the credibility of the 
kind of stress argument made in Satter. In that case, an employee was 
sent home to await the conclusion of an investigation committee, without 
knowing for what she was being blamed.152 While the court cast doubt on 
the stress argument by highlighting the fact that she was fully paid while 
sitting at home, it reflected no awareness of the ambiguity of the 
employee’s situation as a known enhancer of stress.153 
To sum up, we have seen how personal and situational factors can 
lead to the assignment of different significance to similar stressors, either 
enhancing or diminishing their impact. We have also seen that the 
particular intensity of stressors derives, however, not only and not 
predominantly from personal feelings. Rather, it emerges from given 
conditions that can be cognitively assessed. Therefore, an appropriate 
legal evaluation of a particular stress argument would require paying 
attention to particular factual elements and balancing them, a task 
familiar to most legal actors. 
b. Appraisal of Resources 
Because people have different resources, they differ in their ability 
to cope with stressful situations. Financial means, available familial and 
social support, health, energy, education, and other skills, all dictate the 
ability of an individual to cope with stressors.154 Generally, stressors have 
greater potential to cause distress when the cognitive appraisal of the 
individual leads to a conclusion that there are not enough resources to 
cope. Lazarus and Folkman explain that the appraisal of resources 
is more than a mere intellectual exercise in spotting all the things that 
 
 149. Id. at 95–96 (describing experiments by Nomikos and Folkins). 
 150. Id. at 98. 
 151. Id. at 101–03. 
 152. Satter v. Wash. State Dep’t of Ecology, No. C09-5645BHS, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 80520, at 
*14–15 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 10, 2010). 
 153. Id.  
 154. Lazarus & Folkman, supra note 91, at 158–59 (defining resources as “factors that precede 
and influence coping, which in turn mediates stress” and summarizing common coping resources). 
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might be done. It is a complex evaluative process that takes into 
account which coping options are available, the likelihood that a given 
coping option will accomplish what it is supposed to, and the likelihood 
that one can apply a particular strategy or set of strategies effectively.155 
The question of resources also depends on personal and situational 
factors. At the personal level, individuals differ in the resources available 
to them. When facing a cancellation of a wedding, for example, it matters 
greatly whether the bride-to-be is unemployed156 or has her own savings 
and sources of independent income to deal with the crisis.157 It also 
matters whether she is alone in this country, like Ms. Holler158 and other 
foreign brides,159 or has familial and other sources of social support. 
While individual dispositions—such as optimism or self-esteem—are part 
of the personal resources that allow or constrain the coping process (and 
are admittedly less amenable to external assessment),160 most of the other 
personal factors are recognizable and assessable. 
Situational factors can also play a role in the appraisal of resources. 
Time and timing, as a leading example, has much influence: While having 
time can allow access to personal resources such as consultation and 
social support, time pressure can constrain the ability to draw on 
resources. For example, many of the brides-to-be that were pressured to 
sign inferior prenuptial agreements were required to do so in the last few 
days before the wedding and therefore had very limited ability to cope 
with the stressor they were facing.161 
c. A Summary and a Comment About Feelings 
Individual differences in experiencing stress do exist, and the 
judicial review of a stress argument cannot remain general: It requires 
taking into account the concrete aspects of the problem, both personal 
and situational. The appraisal theory’s greatest contribution may have 
been to the debate whether stress is objective, as suggested by inventories 
of common stressors, or subjective, as suggested by the fact that individuals 
respond differently to similar stressors. The appraisal theory suggests that 
both conceptions are true, but neither can fully describe the causes of 
 
 155. Id. at 35. 
 156. See, e.g., Holler v. Holler, 612 S.E.2d 469, 471 (S.C. Ct. App. 2005). 
 157. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Spiegel, 553 N.W.2d 309, 311 (Iowa 1996) (bride is an educated 
business woman with some income). 
 158. Holler, 612 S.E.2d at 471 (bride from Ukraine). 
 159. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Bonds, 5 P.3d 815 (Cal. 2000) (bride from Sweden); see also Friezo 
v. Friezo, 914 A.2d 533 (Conn. 2007) (bride from England). 
 160. Although scholars and experts do analyze and assess them on a regular basis. See, e.g., 
Michele M. Tugade, Positive Emotions and Coping: Examining Dual-Process Models of Resilience, in 
The Oxford Handbook of Stress, Health and Coping, supra note 115. 
 161. See, e.g., Francavilla v. Francavilla, 969 So. 2d 522, 524 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007) (agreement 
signed an hour before the wedding); see also Friezo, 914 A.2d at 542 (agreement signed one day before 
the wedding). 
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stress. Instead, it offers a view of the process as a dynamic transaction 
between personal components and environmental elements, a mixture of 
objective and subjective properties.162 This transactional model currently 
dominates the study of stress and admittedly requires deviation from a 
purely objective approach.163 However, it should not render impossible 
the legal task of analyzing stress arguments. Long years of studies offer 
enough understanding of the patterns of individual responses to stressful 
events to allow informed evaluation. 
Finally, the appraisal approach does not deny the place of emotions in 
the process. However, “emotions” under this approach are not disparaged, 
as in the legal approach, as merely a subjective feeling;164 instead, emotions 
are conceptualized as an integral and important part of an efficient 
cognitive process. For example, a wife’s love for her husband is a relevant 
factor in the appraisal of the stress caused by the husband’s announcement 
that he wants a divorce. Without such emotion, when the wife shares the 
fading of affection and devotion, divorce may be unpleasant but not an 
experience that necessarily creates a new stressful condition. As this 
example shows, the question of love is relevant to the cognitive appraisal 
of the potential stressor of divorce. Indeed, the study of emotions 
demonstrates that emotions play a vital part in a productive cognitive 
process, and therefore should not be ignored.165 So, although there is no 
doubt that emotions are—and indeed should be—involved in the 
appraisal process, it does not justify defining stress as a “feeling” that 
cannot by analyzed. 
 2. Social Differences 
Another reason why stress-related arguments can still be assessed in 
courts despite their seemingly individuated character is the strong link 
between stress and social conditions. The social study of stress has focused 
on people’s backgrounds to identify social patterns and to enable analysis 
of the structural elements that make up the stress process.166 Inspired by 
Pearlin’s Stress Process model, social studies have repeatedly illustrated 
that differences in stress experiences can often be explained by “the 
effects of social inequality on allocations of resources, status, and 
 
 162. Lazarus & Folkman, supra note 91, at 114. 
 163. See Aldwin, supra note 115, at 17 (stating the dominance of the transactional model). 
 164.  See Satter v. Wash. State Dep’t of Ecology, No. C09-5645BHS, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 80520, 
at *16 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 10, 2010). 
 165. See, e.g., Antonio R. Damasio, Descartes’ Error: Emotion, Reason and the Human Brain 
xv (1994) (arguing that emotions are forms of intelligent awareness that are “just as cognitive as other 
percepts”); see also Terry A. Maroney, The Persistent Cultural Script of Judicial Dispassion, 99 Calif. 
L. Rev. 645–49 (2011) (reviewing arguments and literature that explain how emotion plays a critical 
role in reasoning, rationality, and moral judgment). 
 166. Pearlin, supra note 89, at 241–43. 
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power.”167 Social studies research has demonstrated how social factors 
such as gender, race, and socioeconomic status color the stress picture 
and create patterned differences between individuals.168 
a. Gender 
Patterns of exposure and vulnerability to stressors seem to follow 
the “gender line.”169 While research shows that males are more exposed 
and vulnerable to stress caused by, for example, physical violence, war 
traumas, and unemployment, females tend to suffer from increased 
exposure and vulnerability to stress that rises, for instance, from sexual 
violence, interpersonal relationships, and caregiving duties.170 Those 
patterns clearly correlate with the conventional allocation of life domains 
between women and men. Despite many changes in gender roles, men in 
the twenty-first century are still more likely to be the primary providers 
of the financial resources of their family and are expected by others and 
by themselves to fulfill that role.171 Similarly, women are still more likely 
to be the primary homemakers and caretakers of children and aging 
adults, and are still expected (by others and by themselves) to satisfy the 
requirements of domestic roles.172 
Such a gendered social setting obviously exposes more women than 
men to “private-life” and domestic stressors and more men than women to 
“public-life” and market stressors. But the differences go deeper, beyond 
the environments occupied by men and women, to invade individuals’ 
internal worlds and the way they “define and evaluate themselves.”173 
Individuals experience stress more in particular domains because 
performance in those domains is more significant in their lives and is more 
important to their sense of self. Thus the gendered reality modifies the 
meaning individuals assign to general stressors. It also changes the 
personal resources they use to cope with such stressors. Indeed, the study 
of stress has produced some findings that are relevant to the legal 
evaluation of stress arguments made in courts by men and women. 
Perhaps the most consistent and pronounced pattern reported in the 
stress literature is that females are influenced more than males by 
 
 167. R. Jay Turner et al., The Epidemiology of Social Stress, 60 Am. Soc. Rev. 104, 106 (1995). 
 168. Id. Other contexts were studied too. See, e.g., Elizabeth G. Menaghan, Work, Family and 
Their Intersection, in Advances, supra note 89, at 131, 131–48 (lack of education and problems of 
personal status). 
 169. See generally Nancy Levit, The Gender Line (1998). 
 170. See Vicki S. Helgeson, Gender, Stress, and Coping, in The Oxford Handbook of Stress, 
Health and Coping, supra note 115, at 63, 63–70. 
 171.  Id. 
 172.  Id. 
 173. Mary C. Davis et al., Gender: Its Relationship to Stressor Exposure, Cognitive Appraisal/ 
Coping Processes, Stress Responses, and Health Outcomes, in Handbook of Stress Science, supra note 
85, at 247, 247. 
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interpersonal stressors.174 This important finding can be explained by 
females’ greater exposure to and investment in interpersonal situations—
such as through raising children—and even more so by their 
interdependent definition of the self, where risks to significant relationships 
as well as stressors encountered by close others are experienced as 
stressful for them.175 Conversely, males’ self-identity is more tied to an 
independent definition of self with more emphasis on autonomy and, 
therefore, this tends to make men less vulnerable to comparable 
interpersonal stressors. Such consistent empirical results—supported by at 
least 119 survey studies of over 83,000 individuals and never 
contradicted176—should definitely be taken into account when assessing the 
likelihood of sincerity when a woman is making a stress argument based 
on severe interpersonal problems in her life. Such reports reflect a 
recognized social phenomenon and not a random collection of individual 
sentiments, and these reports suggest that more credibility should be given 
to stress arguments that match those established patterns.177 
Interestingly, job-related stressors have a different impact on the 
genders, one which does not precisely mirror interpersonal stressors. In 
fact, women usually report more job-related events that cause stress than 
men. However, before concluding that women are simply more sensitive to 
stress than men,178 it should be noted that women’s vulnerability arises 
from their general lower status at work, as “women are more often 
employed in occupations that entail high demands and low control.”179 
Accordingly, when researchers control for occupational status and 
compare women and men in equivalent jobs, the differences seem to 
disperse.180 One job-related stressor, however, that has greater impact on 
men than on women is unemployment or the loss of a job.181 The same 
logic that explains women’s special vulnerability to interpersonal stressors 
seems to be in effect when it comes to men’s unemployment. Since 
providing for one’s family and having an autonomous status is at the core 
of the traditional view of masculinity and at the heart of many men’s self-
identity, the meaning of job losses and prolonged unemployment periods 
appears to be more dramatic for men.182 
 
 174. Id. at 248. 
 175. Id.; see Helgeson, supra note 170, at 67. 
 176. Davis et al., supra note 173, at 248. 
 177. This suggestion is based on the empirical findings and made without taking a position on the 
robust debate within feminist legal theory about whether women are, by biology or socialization, more 
oriented toward interpersonal connection than men. 
 178. For example, the literature shows that men are more vulnerable to traumatic stressors. See 
Davis et al., supra note 173, at 249–50; Helgeson, supra note 170, at 64–65. 
 179. Davis et al., supra note 173, at 250. 
 180. Id. at 250. 
 181. Helgeson, supra note 170, at 64, 70–71. 
 182.  Id. 
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The distinctive experiences of stress in the lives of women and men 
should be considered when evaluating individual stress arguments. Gender 
taken as a social stressor may explain differences in individuals’ response 
to stressors without making their argument “subjective” in an arbitrary 
sense. Consequentially, more credibility should be given, for example, 
when the stress argument is coming from a man that was exposed to 
violence or a job loss or from a woman that was exposed to sexual 
harassment or a harsh divorce. 
b. Race 
Racism is still a grave and pervasive social problem, and as such it has 
a significant impact on individuals’ experiences of stress. Racial 
discrimination or other mistreatment is now accepted by stress theorists as 
an independent cause of chronic stress.183 Race-related stress as an 
enduring condition develops in a process that begins with discriminatory 
events. Although the initial racist personal experiences may vary in their 
origins, forms, frequency, and covertness,184 they eventually generate a 
general and persistent vulnerability to stress.185 Sometimes the racist 
experiences are so frequent and significant that they create enduring stress 
in and of themselves. At other times, even a few isolated events—when 
joined with collective experiences and historical injustices186—can trigger 
transformations in cognition, behavior, and psychological perceptions. 
These events then tend to increase the vulnerability to racial stressors. 
An individual who was hurt by racist experiences may therefore appraise 
later racist events as more significant and threatening.187 The same 
individual may interpret the meaning of further ambiguous episodes as 
“threatening instances of ethnic discrimination,”188 even when, in the 
absence of these past experiences, such episodes may not appear so 
devastating.189 
In addition, race may deplete coping resources. One of the damages 
of years of institutional, cultural, and interpersonal race discrimination is 
 
 183. See generally Elizabeth Brondolo et al., Racism as a Psychological Stressor, in Handbook of 
Stress Science, supra note 85, at 167; see also Shelly P. Harrell, A Multidimensional Conceptualization of 
Racism-Related Stress: Implications for the Well-Being of People of Color, 70 Am. J. Orthopsychiatry 42 
(2000). 
 184. Those include discriminatory institutional policies, derogating messages conveyed by the 
media, and personal expressions of prejudice. 
 185.  Harrell, supra note 183, at 54. 
 186. Id. at 46–47 (stating that stress is enhanced by collective experiences, when one perceives that 
the racial group with which she identifies is generally not treated fairly, and by historical injustices, 
when individuals believe that the group with which they identify has been historically mistreated or 
oppressed). 
 187. See Rodney Clark et al., Racism as a Stressor for African Americans: A Biopsychosocial Model, 
54 Am. Psychologist 805 (1999). 
 188. Brondolo et al., supra note 183, at 171. 
 189. Harrell, supra note 183, at 45. 
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a segregated reality. Minorities are more likely than other groups to live in 
impoverished areas in which the environmental conditions include poor 
education, relative lack of social support, scarce recreational opportunities, 
and inadequate health services.190 Clearly, such an impoverished reality not 
only creates more stressors, but also plays a role in draining coping 
capabilities. Maya Angelou opens her story Wouldn’t Take Nothing for 
My Journey Now with a compelling description of such race-related 
stressful reality. She writes, “In 1903 the late Mrs. Annie Johnson of 
Arkansas found herself with two toddling sons, very little money, a slight 
ability to read and add simple numbers. To this picture add a disastrous 
marriage and the burdensome fact that Mrs. Johnson was a Negro.”191 
To make things even worse, the racial stress itself, by its own toxic 
nature, not only impairs environmental and social resources, it also tends 
to disrupt and weaken the most personal coping resources such as self-
esteem, agency, and hopeful disposition.192 Moreover, because racism is 
“an uncontrollable stressor,” it often leads people to develop a sense of 
helplessness that further limits their resilience.193 Finally, since racism is 
frequently associated with depressive symptoms—and depression is 
known to reduce social participation, cognitive flexibility, and energy—
many minority individuals are even less equipped to cope with the many 
stressors in their lives.194 
Because of chronic race-related stressors and race-related limited 
coping resources, non-white individuals arguing that they were 
encumbered by stress should not be heard as voicing an individual and 
subjective claim. Rather, the place of race as a social stressor should be 
acknowledged and taken into account in evaluating the credibility and 
intensity of stress arguments made by minorities. 
c. Socioeconomic Status and a Summary 
Low social status also creates or enhances stress, as it impairs coping 
resources. Generally, exposure to stressors and problems in coping with 
them increase “as one goes down the social hierarchy.”195 This has much 
 
 190. Id. at 46. 
 191. Maya Angelou, New Directions, in Wouldn’t Take Nothing for My Journey Now 19, 21 
(1994). 
 192. See Clifford L. Broman et al., The Experience and Consequences of Perceived Racial 
Discrimination: A Study of African Americans, 26 J. Black Psychol. 165–79 (2000) (reporting lower 
levels of perceived mastery); Vanessa M. Nyborg & John F. Curry, The Impact of Perceived Racism: 
Psychological Symptoms Among African American Boys, 32 J. Clinical Child & Adolescent 
Psychol. 258, 259 (2003) (reporting higher levels of hopelessness in Black adolescents). 
 193. Brondolo et al., supra note 183, at 177. 
 194. Id.  
 195. Tarani Chandola & Michael G. Marmot, Socioeconomic Status and Stress, in Handbook of 
Stress Science, supra note 85, at 185, 192. See Turner et al., supra note 167, at 115 (“[T]hese results 
support the conclusion that exposure to stress tends to occur differentially for those differently 
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to do with the lack of control that characterizes a lower social status; it 
causes greater vulnerability to stress due to universal reasons, such as 
economic and social powerlessness, and to more personal reasons such as 
lower self-confidence.196 
To summarize this social dimension of stress, the individual 
experience of stress is seldom merely personal and is rarely unique. Strong 
social pressures emerging from defined contexts such as gender, race, and 
social status create patterns of difference. Moreover, studies have shown 
that the accumulation of such social factors—as in the case of single 
mothers197—adds depth and weight to the problem. Appreciating what 
theorists have called “the social distribution of stress”198 can assist 
decisionmakers seeking to evaluate the credibility of stress arguments; it 
can free them from the limiting notion that stress is too private, subjective, 
and internal to be assessed.199 
D. Outcomes of Stress with a Focus on Consenting 
Prolonged stress can produce both immediate and longer-term 
consequences that run the gamut from the physiological, to the cognitive, 
to the psychological. In many disciplines, the study of stress has mainly 
focused on the negative effect of distress on people’s health and well-
being. Years of studies have produced a body of findings too vast to be 
summarized here.200 Instead, this Subpart will first explore particular 
biological outcomes of stress that can potentially inform the legal 
approach to stress arguments. It then will focus on the impact of stress on 
an individual’s decisionmaking process, which can lead a party to consent 
to a contract that she might otherwise not accept. 
 1. The Biological Outcomes of Stress 
The biological study of the outcomes of stress makes clear that legal 
actors can no longer describe stress as a feeling. In fact, research has shown 
 
situated in the social hierarchy.”). 
 196. Thompson, supra note 84, at 128–29 (citing studies of baboons, dogs, human beings in the Postal 
Service, and others that associate lower status and lower sense of control with higher levels of stress). 
 197. William Avison’s interesting body of work focusing on single mothers offers a vivid example 
of the accumulation of social stressors. His studies show that single mothers suffer from the 
combination of stressors typical to gender, low social status, and often race, and therefore are 
significantly more exposed and vulnerable to stress. See, e.g., William R. Avison, Family Structure and 
Women’s Life: A Life Course Perspective, in Advances, supra note 89, at 71–92. 
 198. Turner et al., supra note 167, at 106. 
 199. Research focusing on personality differences highlights two main qualities that make some 
people more resilient than others to stress: hardiness and having a sense of control (or mastery). See, 
e.g., Lazarus & Folkman, supra note 91, at 212. 
 200. It shows, inter alia, that distress is strongly associated with a variety of severe diseases, with 
speeding the aging and the death of brain cells, and with the development of mental illness. See, e.g., 
Shawn Talbott, The Cortisol Connection: Why Stress Makes You Fat and Ruins Your 
Health—And What You Can Do About It 81 (2007). 
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that the chain of dichotomies shaping traditional western thinking simply 
do not work in the context of stress. Pairs of concepts—such as body/soul, 
reason/emotion, physiology/psychology, and objective/ subjective—are 
never opposites when it comes to stress. Rather, the concepts overlap and 
interrelate such that they cause changes to numerous human systems. 
Think, for instance, about a family man under threat of losing his job. 
When his brain perceives the stressful events, its cognitive appraisal of the 
situation triggers a chemical response: the release of a cascade of “stress 
hormones”—such as adrenaline and cortisol.201 Those hormones then 
“initiate a series of other chemical changes, as well as physiological, 
cognitive, emotional, physical, and behavioral changes.”202 Now the man 
may suffer from some physical symptoms, such as headaches, lack of sleep, 
weight gain, and higher blood pressure. All of these are known results of 
overexposure to stress hormones. Psychologically, he may also become less 
patient with the people around him, more moody, perhaps even depressed, 
and this might add to the work-related situation or to personal problems at 
home. If the problems persist and become chronic, the constant presence 
of stress hormones will cause additional physiological and psychological 
problems. Those may include an inability to turn off the stress response, 
leading to even more exposure to those hormones.203 Thus, at the most 
fundamental level, recognizing the connection between stressful situations 
and overexposure to stress hormones can help legal actors conceptualize 
the problem of stress as much more than a feeling. The next step is to 
recognize the common symptoms of overexposure to stress hormones, 
which can assist both in structuring and in evaluating stress arguments. 
 
 201. For the evolutionary role of adrenaline and cortisol as essential to the known “flight or flight” 
mechanism, see id. at ch. 3; see also id. at 31 (“Adrenaline is responsible for the ‘up’ feeling that causes 
excitement, while cortisol is responsible for modulating the way our bodies use various fuel sources.”). 
Adrenaline, also known by its American name, epinephrine, is one of the two main hormones secreted 
in response to stress by the sympathetic nervous system (the other one being noradrenaline). Cortisol 
is one of the most known hormones in a group of hormones called “glucocorticoids” that are secreted 
by the adrenal gland following the release of special hormones in the brain. The full description of the 
different hormones that play a role in times of stress is beyond the scope of this Article. Robert 
Sapolsky offers a fascinating detailed explanation to general audiences. In a nutshell, once a stressor is 
recognized, two waves of hormonal response follow: “Epinephrine acts within seconds; glucocorticoids 
back this activity up over the course of minutes or hours.” Robert M. Sapolsky, Why Zebras Don’t 
Get Ulcers: The Acclaimed Guide to Stress, Stress-Related Diseases, and Coping, 30–31 (3d ed. 
2004) (“Together, glucocorticoids and the secretions of the sympathetic nervous system (epinephrine 
and norepinephrine) account for a large percentage of what happens in your body during stress.”). For 
the sake of simplicity, those waves of hormones with their orchestrated secretion will hereinafter be 
called “the stress hormones.” 
 202. Thompson, supra note 84, at 114. 
 203. Id. at 116. 
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a. Insomnia 
Chronic inability to sleep is a known result of stress, and it can be 
explained by high levels of stress hormones. Biologist Robert Sapolsky’s 
acclaimed and fascinating book Why Zebras Don’t Get Ulcers204 
emphasized this symptom,205 adding that “75 percent of cases of insomnia 
are triggered by some major stressor.”206 As Sapolsky maintains, “stress 
not only can decrease the total amount of sleep but can compromise the 
quality of whatever sleep you do manage.”207 The connection between 
stress and sleeping problems is explained by the fluctuating levels of 
cortisol in our bodies. Under normal conditions, the highest levels of this 
stress hormone are present in our bodies during the early morning, 
helping us to wake up and face the tasks of the day.208 Those levels are 
supposed to decline throughout the day, eventually allowing us to calm 
down enough when the time comes to get some sleep.209 However, 
chronic stress prevents this healthy decline of cortisol and causes high 
levels of it all day long, leading to interrupted sleep.210 A vicious circle 
follows: Sleep deprivation is not only a symptom of stress, but also a 
universal stressor that in turn contributes to even higher levels of cortisol 
and, therefore, more problems sleeping.211 Recognizing insomnia as a 
symptom of stress could have been useful in Gascho, in which the 
plaintiff’s stress argument was supported by undisputed evidence 
regarding a severe—and professionally medicated—sleeping problem.212 
Accordingly, the scientifically documented “cortisol connection” between 
stress and sleeping problems could assist courts in the evaluation of stress 
arguments in cases that include proven insomnia. 
b. Depression 
Another known symptom of stress that is associated with excessive 
stress hormones is depression. Sapolsky’s work has highlighted this tight 
tie,213 and as more recent works show, “it is evident that an inexorable link 
 
 204. Sapolsky, supra note 201. 
 205. Id. at 226–38. 
 206. Id. at 236. 
 207. Id. 
 208. Talbott, supra note 200, at 99. 
 209.  Id. 
 210.  Id. 
 211. Sapolsky, supra note 201, at 227 (“Not getting enough sleep is a stressor; being stressed 
makes it harder to sleep. Yup, we’ve got a dread vicious cycle on our hands.”). 
 212. Gascho v. Scheurer Hosp., 400 F. App’x 978, 980 (6th Cir. 2010) (noting that, at the time of 
contracting, Ms. Gascho was taking Lunesta, Ambien, Benadryl, and Ultram to help her sleep). See 
Satter v. Wash. State Dep’t of Ecology, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 80520, at *16 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 10, 
2010) (reporting a stress reaction that included an inability to sleep). 
 213. See generally Sapolsky, supra note 201, at 271–308 (discussing the strong ties of stress and 
depression); see also Talbott, supra note 200, at 23 (describing the linkage between over- and under-
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exists between stress and depression, and new research has dramatically 
increased our understanding of the relationship between the two.”214 This 
strong bond between stress and depression is critical to our topic in at least 
two ways. First and most basically, since distressed parties seeking relief 
sometimes present evidence with regard to their diagnosed depression, 
realizing that stress often causes depression can make their argument 
significantly more credible. As with stress, depression is not merely a 
feeling, and although we all get truly upset from time to time, diagnosed 
depression is different: It is a medically acknowledged disease with 
severe, sometimes life-threatening, consequences.215 Thus, when a party 
describes high levels of stress that led to a diagnosis of depression, courts 
can benefit from the rapidly accumulating knowledge that shows how 
typical such a connection is.216 
Second, when people are under stress combined with depression, 
there is very little they can actively do. There is a proven connection 
between stress, depression, and impaired agency. A frequent feature of 
major depression is “psychomotor retardation”—a severe decrease in the 
ability to concentrate or act, which makes even simple activities, such as 
making an appointment or getting dressed in the morning, exhausting and 
nearly impossible to accomplish.217 Furthermore, stress and depression are 
also associated with cognitive “learned helplessness,”218 that is, an 
inclination to surrender to one’s situation out of “a distortive belief that 
there is no control or outlets in any circumstance.”219 Studies have shown 
that by overgeneralizing the meaning of a particular stressful situation, the 
distressed tend to extend the original helplessness and conclude that 
there is nothing that can be done even if others can see possible paths of 
action.220 Given the impact of stress and depression, it is much more 
explicable why the alternative to “stand pat and fight,” which many 
courts view as reasonable,221 is quite clearly out of the realm of possible 
responses for many of those who are depressed. 
 
exposure to cortisol and stress-related depression). 
 214. David A. Gutman & Charles B. Nemeroff, Stress and Depression, in Handbook of Stress 
Science, supra note 85, at 345, 353. 
 215. The study of depression is, of course, beyond the scope of this Article. However, it seems to 
me as if the legal disregard of depression has a high correlation to the legal disregard of stress. 
 216. Stress arguments are often accompanied by arguments and evidence regarding depression. 
Currently many courts disregard that aspect of the argument even when the depression is severe and 
well proved. For a recommendation of a different approach, see infra Part III. 
 217. Sapolsky, supra note 201, at 275. 
 218. See generally Martin E. P. Seligman, Helplessness: On Depression, Development, and 
Death (1975) (one of the most influential works in psychology in general and the definitive book on 
the subject of learned helplessness in particular); see also Sapolsky, supra note 201, at 494–95 (offering 
a review of learned helplessness literature in the context of stress and depression). 
 219. Sapolsky, supra note 201, at 305. 
 220. Id. at 301–02. 
 221. See supra note 39 and accompanying text. 
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 2. Stress and Impaired Decisionmaking 
Consenting to a contract is a product of a decisionmaking process. 
Such a view is supported by the legal doctrines of duress, unconscionability, 
and undue influence—in their shared requirement that the party seeking 
relief prove she has no reasonable alternative to agreement. 
Understanding the impact of stress on the effectiveness of that 
decisionmaking processes and any available alternatives to agreeing is thus 
important. As we shall now see, when stress is present the legal 
presumption that the availability of alternatives means that the consenting 
party made a meaningful choice is frequently unsound. 
a. The General Effect of Stress on Decisionmaking 
Some stress studies show that prolonged stress can “wreak havoc 
with decision making.”222 Although the intersection of decisionmaking 
models and stress theories is yet to be fully developed,223 stress theorists 
believe that chronic stress can lead to dysfunctional decisionmaking.224 
Specifically, judgments made under stress are limited because the brain is 
consumed by the need to cope with the stressors and their outcomes. 
Studies of the impact of stress on cognition began following World 
War II and resulted in an expressed consensus that the “competence of 
human judgment is decreased by stress.”225 Only the recent development of 
the neurosciences, however, has allowed researchers access to the 
processes in the brain triggered by exposure to stress. The current findings, 
albeit not conclusive, reveal how stress impairs high-order brain abilities 
that are essential for effective decisionmaking—specifically, those 
operations performed by the prefrontal cortex (“PFC”). Under non-
stress conditions, the PFC orchestrates the “intelligent regulation of 
behaviour, thought and emotion.”226 Under conditions of psychological 
stress, however, stress hormones interfere with that regulation.  
Evolutionarily geared to prepare the body for a fight-or-flight 
response,227 those hormones limit the ability of the brain to do other, less 
urgent tasks. Specifically, they work to limit memory and attention 
regulation as well as other complex brain activities performed by the 
 
 222. Thompson, supra note 84, at 117. 
 223. Hammond, supra note 85, at 25–27 (describing the gulf that separates theorists of stress from 
decisionmaking researchers). 
 224. See Eduardo Dias-Ferreira et al., Chronic Stress Causes Frontostriatal Reorganization and 
Affects Decision-Making, 325 Science 621, 621–25 (2009). 
 225. Hammond, supra note 85, at 6. See generally Irving L. Janis & Leon Mann, Decision Making: 
A Psychological Analysis of Conflict, Choice, and Commitment (1977). 
 226. Amy F. T. Arnsten, Stress Signaling Pathways That Impair Prefrontal Cortex Structure and 
Function, 10 Nat. Rev. Neurosci. 410, 411 (2009). 
 227. Id. at 412. 
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PFC.228 Therefore, under stress conditions, the amount and quality of 
information we can recall, process, and store declines.229 At the same time, 
the high levels of stress hormones strengthen the function of other 
regions of the brain; the hormones released under stress “switch the 
brain from thoughtful, reflective regulation by the PFC to more rapid 
reflexive regulation by the amygdala and other subcortical structures.”230 
While such a brain process may be efficient when people are under a 
physical threat, it is fundamentally detrimental when they are expected 
to make rational choices requiring analysis, self-control, and long-term 
thinking.231 It can lead to dysfunctional decisionmaking.232 
b. The Specific Impact of Stress on the Evaluation of 
Alternatives 
Since the legal analysis of decisions made under stress depends on 
the analysis under the reasonable alternative test, understanding the 
impact of stress not only on the final decision, but also more particularly 
on one’s ability to recognize and assess existing alternatives, becomes 
important. While careful appraisal of alternatives is essential to every 
appropriate decision,233 it is very difficult to sustain under stress when one 
“can’t think straight.”234 Again, the problem stems from the release of 
stress hormones. They cause arousal that in turn creates “hypervigilance”: 
hasty and impulsive patterns of behavior that lead to ineffective 
decisionmaking. Such patterns were observed in an experimental study 
that focused specifically on the way stress influences the scanning and 
consideration of available alternatives.235 
The alternatives study compared “the manner in which stressed and 
unstressed individuals consider and scan decision alternatives,”236 and it is 
often cited in the decisionmaking literature to explain how stress limits 
the ability to choose between alternatives.237 One hundred and one 
 
 228.  Id. 
 229. Thompson, supra note 84, at 136. 
 230. Arnsten, supra note 226, at 415. 
 231. Id. In addition, chronic prolonged stress may even lead to structural, longer term changes in 
the PFC. Id. at 418–19. 
 232. See Dias-Ferreira et al., supra note 224. 
 233. Irving L. Janis, Decisionmaking Under Stress, in Handbook of Stress: Theoretical and 
Clinical Aspects 60 (Leo Goldberger & Shlomo Bereznitz eds., 2d ed. 1993) (describing the vigilance 
that is required to cope with stress and stating that vigilance exists when “the decision maker searches 
painstakingly for relevant information . . . and appraises alternatives carefully before making a 
choice”). 
 234. Thompson, supra note 84, at 159. 
 235. See generally Giora Keinan, Decision Making Under Stress: Scanning of Alternatives Under 
Controllable and Uncontrollable Threats, 52 J. Personality & Soc. Psychol. 639 (1987). 
 236.  Id. at 640. 
 237. See, e.g., Hammond, supra note 85, at 170–76, 216; Dan Zakay, The Impact of Time Perception 
Processes on Decision Making Under Time Stress, in Time Pressure and Stress in Human Judgment 
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students participated in the study and took a computerized multiple-
choice analogies test containing fifteen questions.238 Students were asked 
to choose the correct answer out of six alternatives presented separately 
on the screen.239 They were able to navigate freely between the reviewed 
alternatives and to control both the order and the speed of their review.240 
To choose one of the alternatives, the students had to press the enter key, 
which then prompted the display of the next question on the screen.241 The 
time that the students spent reviewing each alternative as well as the 
sequence by which the alternatives were visited were recorded. The goal 
was mainly to trace the method of deciding rather than to simply measure 
the quality of the end result. The participants were randomly divided to 
groups: Some were only asked to do their best, while others had to take 
the test under stress created as part of the experiment.242 Importantly, the 
stressed participants were put under stress without using time pressure: 
They were free to review each alternative for as much time as they 
needed and to revisit alternatives that seemed to require more attention. 
Instead, the stressor chosen for this study was the threat of electric 
shock.243 While time pressure would predictably yield a rushed style of 
decisionmaking,244 it may be less comprehensible how being under a 
different kind of stress impacts the analysis of alternatives. 
The results of the alternatives study were remarkable. The 
participants under stress demonstrated a significantly inferior performance 
compared to their non-stressed counterparts. First, stress had the 
detrimental effect of “premature closure,” defined as making a decision 
before all available alternatives were considered.245 Although few non-
stressed participants engaged in premature closure, 80% of the cases in 
which alternatives were ignored occurred among the distressed 
subjects.246 In fact, many of those subjects “chose an answer before they 
had even seen the correct alternative.”247 The study’s findings regarding 
premature closure lend support to works describing the effect of stress 
on attention in which the cognitive process is impaired by a “tunnel 
 
and Decision Making 60 (Ola Svenson & A. John Maule eds., 1993). 
 238.  Keinan, supra note 235, at 640. 
 239.  Id. 
 240.  Id. 
 241.  Id. 
 242.  Id. at 641. 
 243.  Id. 
 244. Much work has been dedicated to time pressure as a stressor that impairs decisionmaking. 
See, e.g., Janis & Mann, supra note 225, at 59 (examining the role of imminence within the context of 
decisionmaking processes and stating that the quality of decisionmaking depends on the answer to the 
question: “Is there sufficient time to make a careful search for an evaluation of information and 
advice?”); see also Lazarus & Folkman, supra note 91, at 93. 
 245. Keinan, supra note 235, at 639. 
 246. Id. at 642. 
 247. Id. at 643. 
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vision,” that is, an inclination to only focus on limited dimensions of a 
given problem. 
Second, stress also caused “nonsystematic scanning,” defined as a 
disorganized and scattered method of review in which the stressed 
decisionmaker “searches frantically for a way out of the dilemma, and 
rapidly shifts back and forth between alternatives.”248 Recording every 
departure from a serial sequence of review,249 the study demonstrated 
significantly deficient scanning patterns in the distressed groups. 
Compared to the non-stressed participants, subjects under stress visited 
the alternative answers in a much more scattered and disordered fashion.250 
Finally, in terms of “quality of performance,” defined as choosing 
the right answers, subjects under stress decided incorrectly at a higher 
rate than their counterparts.251 Notably, the distressed were not simply 
wrong more often. The study also showed a strong correlation between 
incomplete patterns of scanning of alternatives and decreased quality of 
performance: 67% of the cases of premature closure, for example, led to 
choosing an incorrect answer.252 This last point has a palpable link to the 
legal stress argument. Typically, parties seeking relief and stress-sensitive 
judges attempt to explain the mistaken decision to consent to a 
disadvantageous contract by the failure to engage in an appropriate 
consideration process. The alternatives study supports the reasonableness 
of that argument. 
The alternatives study demonstrates that stress significantly impairs 
the consideration of alternatives and leads to flawed decisions.253 The 
application of these findings to the evaluation of contractual stress 
arguments in general, and more specifically to the “reasonable alternative” 
test, is notable. It suggests that judges may base their conclusions 
regarding the quality of apparent consent on alternatives not truly 
available to distressed individuals. Such a possibility clearly undermines 
the conventional presumption that the “reasonable alternative” test is 
objective. It thus also suggests that the application of the alternative test 
to distressed individuals requires adjustment to take into account the fact 
that stress distorts the “consenter’s” understanding of such alternatives. 
All in all, this Part has shown that the conventional legal analysis of 
consenting under stress cannot be reconciled with the results other 
disciplines have produced in their study of stress. The conflict mainly exists 
 
 248. Id. at 639 (citing Janis, supra note 233, at 72). 
 249. Id. at 641 (explaining the measurement of that aspect of the performance). 
 250. Id. at 642. 
 251.  Id. 
 252. Id. 
 253. Although the nature of the experiment did not require lengthy consideration of each of the 
alternatives, other works also demonstrate that stress shortens the time dedicated to the assessment of 
each alternative. See id. at 640–43 (discussing “temporal narrowing”). 
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around the two pillars of the conventional legal analysis: (1) classifying the 
condition of stress as a subjective feeling, and (2) refusing relief whenever 
reasonable alternatives seem to have been available. While some 
immediate legal implications were already discussed in this Part, the goal 
of the next Part is to further integrate the non-legal knowledge with the 
legal issue. 
III.  Integration: Stress-Sensitive Contractual Analysis 
So far we have seen how the problem of consenting under stress is 
disregarded in most courts or—in rare cases—is recognized in an under-
theorized manner. We have also seen how other disciplines have studied 
the human condition of stress, coming to cogent conclusions about 
stressors and their impact. The goal of this Part, therefore, is to integrate 
the discussions and to offer a stress-sensitive contractual analysis of the 
problem of consent under stress. In general, the task calls for both a 
theoretical and practical discussion. Theoretically, the study of stress 
illuminates the ways the tenets of consent and fault—which are 
fundamental under contract law—play out in the context of agreements 
made under stress. The practical question is how willing legal actors, from 
lawyers to judges, can utilize the knowledge about stress to improve the 
legal response to this condition. I now turn to those two aspects of the 
integration task. 
A. The Study of Stress and Theories of Contract Law 
The contractual discourse on stress arguments circles around two 
leading ideas—quality of consent and level of fault. When a stress 
argument is made, courts have to strike a balance between those ideas, as 
they stand in conflict and typically reside with opposing parties: defective 
consent on the side of the distressed party seeking relief versus some 
fault on the side of the unstressed party who is insisting on enforcement. 
More often than not, judicial concern for finding enough fault trumps the 
judicial concern about flawed consent and therefore the stress argument 
is dismissed.254 It is therefore imperative to re-examine both the role of 
consent and the notion of fault in light of the understanding of stress. I 
argue that a new balance is required because under stress a person’s 
consent is “weaker” and the fault of the other party is “stronger” than 
what courts have thus far considered. 
 
 254. Alan Wertheimer, Coercion 53 (1987) (arguing that the modern doctrine of duress can be 
seen as being more about “wrongness and unfairness” than about “freedom and voluntariness”). 
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 1. Stress and the Problem of Consent 
In contrast to the ideal of freedom of contract, the consent produced 
under stress may no longer reflect a free choice or a true exercise of the 
human will. Rather, stress typically constrains and distorts the process of 
decisionmaking, producing a defective form of consent that can hardly 
justify enforcement. When we recognize the toll of stress on the quality 
of consent, two contrasting reactions come to mind. On the one hand, it 
can be argued—following Judge Posner’s reasoning255—that contract law 
does not and should not care about the quality of consent once it has 
been given. According to this line of thought, consent is understood in 
absolute terms, as either perfectly present or completely missing. 
Arguably, an expression of consent functions in a dichotomous world and 
is either valid or invalid (if coerced by the other party). Such a view denies 
the possibility that non-coercive or less-than-coercive conditions can create 
an act of consent that does not amount to a meaningful consent. 
On the other hand (and in opposition to Judge Posner’s reasoning), 
it can be argued that contract law—being the field of law based on 
voluntary choices and consent256—must examine not only the existence of 
consent, but also the actual quality of consent. Accordingly, many shades 
of consent—on the spectrum between perfect consent and coerced 
consent—exist. And, consequentially, some higher levels of impaired 
consent should not be sufficient for the enforcement of contracts, even if 
they were not fully produced by the fault of the other party. 
In choosing between those two distinct approaches, it should be 
noted that, as a descriptive matter, the modern law of contracts does not 
confirm the first, Posnerian view. Instead, the modern law of contracts 
reflects some sensitivity to the quality of consent, beyond its mere 
existence. In fact, all the contractual defenses, which reflect acknowledged 
reasons to avoid enforceability, can be explained by the need to recognize 
the problem of defective consent.257 As a result, children,258 mentally ill 
individuals,259 alcoholics,260 parties operating under mistake,261 those who 
 
 255. See supra notes 25–32 and accompanying text (discussing the Selmer case). 
 256. See Brian H. Bix, Contracts, in The Ethics of Consent 251, 266–67 (Franklin G. Miller & 
Alan Wertheimer eds., 2010) (portraying consent as the essence of contract law and discussing consent 
theories of contracts); see also Randy E. Barnett, A Consent Theory of Contract, 86 Colum. L. Rev. 
269, 270 (1986) (proposing that the moral basis of a contract is founded on the consent of the parties to 
exercise rights and assume duties). 
 257. Bix, supra note 256, at 257; see Wertheimer, supra note 254, at 233 (“Hard choices are 
importantly different from other choices. They have a particularly severe constraining effect”); Peter 
Birks & Chin Nyuk Yin, On the Nature of Undue Influence, in Good Faith and Fault in Contract 
Law 57, 58 (Jack Beatson & Daniel Friedmann eds., 1995) (arguing that the doctrine of undue 
influence is about impaired consent, not about wicked exploitation). 
 258. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 14 (1981). 
 259. Id. § 15. 
 260. Id. § 16. 
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are dependent on others,262 or those who are lacking in bargaining power263 
may get relief under our conventional law, despite their apparent 
consent.264 What all those examples have in common is the tenet that 
meaningful consent—and not simply a token of consent—is required to 
have a valid contract. Moreover, although the current Restatement 
avoids choosing between a focus on deterring bad behavior and on the 
quality of consent, the first Restatement emphasized the importance of 
free will265 and, at least in one jurisdiction, taking advantage of the other 
party’s stress is explicitly covered by the law of duress.266 
At the normative level, the question becomes more challenging: 
Should contract law care about cases in which the consent does not 
represent a true will? In her analysis of the concept of consent, Robin 
West has suggested that we are all too quick to assume that consensual 
acts, such as entering into contracts, reflect a true choice made by the 
consenting party.267 In reality, she argues, many consensual acts only mean 
that outright coercion has not occurred.268 And, as West puts it, “[t]hat it 
is consensual doesn’t tell us that it is harmless, or good, or beneficial. . . . 
It still might have been exploitative, alienating, or grossly unfair.”269 In 
the context of consenting to have sex, West suggests that agreeing to an 
arrangement that is unfair or harmful can reside in an overlooked place 
 
 261. Id. § 153. 
 262. Id. § 177. 
 263. Id. § 208. 
 264. Cf. Danielle Kie Hart, Contract Formation and the Entrenchment of Power, 41 Loy. U. Chi. 
L.J. 175, 218 (2009) (“[M]odern contract law, at least as presently constructed, will not be able to 
remedy [problems of defective consent] effectively using its expanded policing doctrines.”). 
 265. Compare Restatement of Contracts § 492 (1932) (“Duress . . . means . . . any wrongful 
threat of one person by words or other conduct that induces another to enter into a transaction under 
the influence of such fear as precludes him from exercising free will and judgment, if the threat was 
intended or should reasonably have been expected to operate as an inducement.”), with Restatement 
(Second) of Contracts § 175 (“If a party’s manifestation of assent is induced by an improper threat 
by the other party that leaves the victim no reasonable alternative, the contract is voidable by the 
victim.”). Interestingly, the comment following the first Restatement’s definition stressed the need to 
protect the vulnerable from agreeing to contracts that they are not interested in. In its relevant part it 
reads: 
The question is rather, did it put one entering into the transaction in such fear as to preclude 
the exercise by him of free will and judgment. Age, sex, capacity, relation of the parties, 
attendant circumstances, must all be considered. Persons of a weak or cowardly nature are 
the very ones that need protection. The courageous can usually protect themselves; timid 
persons are generally the ones influenced by threats, and the unscrupulous are not allowed 
to impose upon them because they are so unfortunately constituted. 
Restatement of Contracts § 492 cmt. a. 
 266. The courts of Illinois, for example, define duress as the imposition, oppression, undue 
influence, or taking of undue advantage of the stress of another whereby one is deprived of the exercise 
of his free will. See Pierce v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co. 65 F.3d 562, 569 (7th Cir. 1995). 
 267. See Robin West, Sex, Law, and Consent, in The Ethics of Consent, supra note 256, at 221. 
 268.  Id. 
 269.  Id. at 234. 
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on the spectrum—one that lies between consenting to something that is 
good (pleasurable sex) and consenting due to coercion (rape).270 In this 
unnoticed middle ground, we find what West calls the “unwanted 
consent”: consenting to something one does not desire.271 People often 
consent despite themselves, with different degrees of reluctance, for a 
variety of reasons that make consenting better than refusing.272 Stress, I 
argue, produces such unwanted consent. And since it is inferior to the 
ideal meaningful consent, which expresses human will and freedom, it 
should not be subject to the same legal presumption of validity that is 
offered to fuller consent. Rather, impaired consent calls for a more 
careful and contextual response, one that aspires to place any given case 
somewhere on the spectrum between full consent and full coercion. 
To clarify: I am not arguing that every point on the above spectrum 
justifies relief. In some cases, impaired consent should be tolerated, as it 
reflects the imperfect human condition and the need to allow markets to 
function. In other situations, however, the given consent represents too 
dangerous a sacrifice. Compare, for example, the following demonstrations 
of assent: first, one’s automatic consent to a long form contract for a sale of 
goods; second, one’s reluctant consent to a pay cut in a difficult economy; 
and third, one’s consent to resign a job and release her employer from 
liability after being sexually harassed.273 In all three cases, consent has 
been expressed, but its quality has been admittedly compromised. The 
cases reflect, however, different places on the spectrum. In the first 
example of the form contract, we can assume some desire for the 
purchased goods without true consent to the terms of getting them. In 
the second example, the pay-cut agreement is further away from full 
consent because both the goal of the contract and its terms are unwanted. 
Finally, the “resign and release” agreement in the third example is the 
most problematic because it involves a compromise in the consenting 
party’s state of mind—in addition to the contract’s unwanted terms and 
results. The study of stress is valuable in calling attention to such “third-
degree” cases of impaired consent. It cautions us against treating them as 
similar to other cases of compromised consent: In those cases of 
consenting under stress, there is an appearance of consent, but in terms 
of the necessary state of mind, we are dangerously close to having no 
consent at all. 
 
 270.  Id. at 235. 
 271.  Id. at 246–47. 
 272. In fact, many commentators have convincingly argued that for a host of reasons—from lack of 
awareness, to lack of alternatives, to cognitive biases—meaningful consent is almost always absent and 
therefore reflects the ideal exception rather than the norm. See, e.g., Bix, supra note 256, at 251. 
 273. The last scenario is based on the facts of Meyers v. Trugreen, Inc., No. 03 C 7570, 2004 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 9200, at *7–8 (N.D. Ill. May 21, 2004). 
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There is a distinct risk in enforcing the products of severely impaired 
consent, and it goes beyond the unfair terms of the deal. Under stressful 
conditions, the contractual process itself is injurious, and the lack of an 
appropriate legal process or remedy exacerbates the harm. Consenting due 
to desperate conditions damages a person’s integrity and sense of self-
sovereignty.274 The distressed individual might internalize the message that 
her anguish and true wishes do not matter in courts of law. This in turn 
makes the contractual experience highly alienating, separating the pains of 
personhood from the legal act of consent and—by way of enforcement—
allowing exploitation.275 In other words, without an appropriate legal 
process or remedy, consenting under stress can be more than immediately 
disempowering: It entails damage to the self-image of the distressed and 
further deepens her powerlessness. 
For example, litigation over divorce settlements illustrates the unique 
damage that follows from failing to recognize the category of impaired 
consent. Under the pressure of divorce, women often sign harmful divorce 
settlements, and later courts often reject their request for relief. 
Specifically when responding to stress arguments by divorced women, 
courts deny the possibility that stress could create impaired consent. 
Consider, for example, the following statement: “While [the] wife’s fear 
that she may lose custody of her children no doubt caused her anxiety, 
we do not recognize this as a factor impairing her ability to exercise her 
free will and make a meaningful choice.”276 
Even though courts frequently admit the stressfulness of divorce, 
they treat it as “normal” and “common,” and therefore as a condition 
that does not negate consent. Consequently, they fail to discern the 
situations in which the stress was so severe that it led to impaired rather 
than sufficient consent. Penelope Bryan studied many cases of divorce 
settlements and has convincingly argued that women pay the price for 
that judicial approach.277 In the part of her study that focuses on the 
refusal to release women from their own apparent consent, Bryan 
explains that courts fail to protect women because they refuse to 
recognize gender differences in the experience of stress following 
divorce. In her words, courts “minimize wives’ complaints of anxiety, 
depression, and mental distress, commonly noting that divorce always 
causes stress.”278  
Adding the study of stress to this analysis, it is important to 
remember that every scale of common stressors includes divorce and 
 
 274. West, supra note 267, at 245–47. 
 275.  See id. at 234. 
 276. In re Marriage of Steadman, 670 N.E.2d 1146, 1151–52 (Ill. App. 3d 1996). 
 277. Penelope Eileen Bryan, Women’s Freedom to Contract at Divorce: A Mask for Contextual 
Coercion, 47 Buff. L. Rev. 1153, 1270–73 (1999). 
 278. Id. at 1257. 
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ranks it high above many other stressful life events. This means that 
outside of law there is nothing “normal” about the level of stress in those 
cases, which is known to be acutely high. Furthermore, despite this 
common (“objective”) story, the impact of divorce on individuals is not 
identical. Rather, with regard to gender, the study of stress proves that 
interpersonal stressors, such as divorce, have a heightened impact on 
women.279 To compound matters, women are especially susceptible to 
stress-related depression that in turn further limits their coping abilities 
and augments, in a vicious circle, their initial distress.280 Accordingly, it 
seems reasonable to see how women are more prone than men to suffer 
from the problem of impaired consent in the context of divorce 
settlements. Without awareness of this potential problem impacting 
consent, women’s participation in this contractual process is highly 
damaging. As Bryan put it: “[D]ivorce settlements, contrary to popular 
wisdom, frequently restrict rather than enhance women’s life choices by 
leaving them impoverished and embittered.”281 
Enforcing contracts that are based on severely impaired consent is a 
clear and immediate danger to those who are consenting under stress, 
but it is also a significant hazard to the idea of contracts and to the 
theoretical justification of enforcing them. A system that cannot 
appropriately differentiate between fully formed and defective consent 
may eventually lose its fundamental legitimacy.282 As such, consent under 
stress that amounts to severely impaired consent should be regarded as a 
ground for relief and a justified reason for invalidating a contract. 
Nonetheless, this line of reasoning has had detractors. 
Some commentators have cautioned against a liberal use of the 
defenses to enforceability—such as duress and unconscionability—
arguing that extensive protection of weaker parties may deter market 
players from dealing with them, ultimately limiting the ability of weaker 
parties to function in a market society.283 However, this argument is not 
convincing for two main reasons.284 First, this argument predicts that even 
the potential award of relief would necessarily hinder the ability of the 
protected individuals’ to create binding contracts. But this prediction is 
 
 279. See supra note 170 and accompanying text. 
 280. Sapolsky, supra note 201, at 290–91. 
 281. Bryan, supra note 277, at 1170. 
 282. Inspired by West’s argument, supra note 267, I want to compare it to the damage caused by 
years of ignoring the problem of lack of consent to sex between married partners. More generally, a 
system that operates on behalf of justice—but at the same time tolerates and allows clear injustice—
eventually has to change or face a loss of credibility. 
 283. Selmer Co. v. Blakeslee-Midwest Co., 704 F.2d 924, 928 (7th Cir. 1983) (“It is a detriment, not 
a benefit, to one’s long-run interests not to be able to make a binding commitment.”). See Richard A. 
Epstein, Unconscionability: A Critical Reappraisal, 18 J.L. & Econ. 293, 306–08 (1975). 
 284. The question raises the broader issue of paternalism, which lies beyond the scope of this 
Article. 
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questionable: While the prospect of protection may deter some market 
players from contracting with the “protected,” in other cases it may not. 
It is at least as probable that the prospect of legal relief will educate or 
incentivize market players to negotiate more reasonably to avoid the 
invalidation of their contract. As one commentator noted, the “potential 
husband might be interested in marrying even if the terms of his 
proposed premarital agreement must be made more fair.”285  
Second, this argument assumes a simplistic model of the market, 
where the weaker market players can easily be identified and avoided. 
However, while some market players may develop a preference not to deal 
with an identified group of people to escape judicial scrutiny of 
transactions,286 it is much harder, or even impossible, to systematically 
avoid parties under stress. This conclusion arises from the fact that stress, 
as a form of vulnerability, is a universal and inevitable human condition 
that transcends group identities and instead necessitates contextual and 
concrete analysis, rather than a group-based protection.287 Everyone is 
vulnerable and can become distressed, because we are all susceptible to an 
“ever-present possibility of harm, injury, and misfortune.”288 Thus, stress 
presents a “post-identity paradigm”289 that alleviates the risk of rejection of 
particular disadvantaged groups from the contractual sphere. Employers, 
for example, cannot avoid contracting with their resigning employees, even 
if courts will be more aware of the stressfulness of a job loss and will 
heighten their scrutiny over the terms of separation agreements. Since the 
proposed judicial protection on the basis of stress is carefully calibrated to 
context, it can create an incentive against exploitation without risking the 
ability of any particular group to create binding contracts. 
 2. Stress and the Problem of Fault 
Even those who are convinced that the quality of consent—whether 
“perfect” or impaired—should stand at the center of any discussion 
involving stress and contracts may still wonder about its relationship to 
the concept of fault. Can impaired consent itself be sufficient ground for 
relief or should the impairment result necessarily from faulty acts of the 
other party? 
 
 285. Bix, supra note 256, at 260. 
 286. I have argued elsewhere that such preference is discriminatory and that contract law, in 
addition to other laws, should ban it. See Hila Keren, “We Insist! Freedom Now”: Does Contract 
Doctrine Have Anything Constitutional to Say? 11 Mich. J. Race & L. 133, 172 (2005) (explaining why 
and how contract law has an essential role to play in the context of discrimination even when anti-
discrimination laws are available and may apply). 
 287. In making this argument I am drawing on Martha Fineman’s compelling vulnerability theory. 
See generally Martha Albertson Fineman, The Vulnerable Subject: Anchoring Equality in the Human 
Condition, 20 Yale J. L. & Feminism 1 (2008). 
 288. Id. at 9. 
 289. Id. at 17. 
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We have already seen that requiring fault as a condition to relief is 
sometimes explained by the need to discourage wrongful behavior.290 The 
main problem with such a fault-based justification is that it conforms to 
the policies supporting tort law, rather than to the logic of contract. As 
many legal scholars have posited: Modern contract law is mainly fault-
free, while tort law is the field of law saturated with fault.291 Remarkably, 
although the fault-based justification is attributed to Judge Posner, it 
stands in stark conflict with Posner’s general writings on the topic of fault 
in contract law. In a symposium dedicated to the “fault line” that divides 
tort law from contract law,292 Judge Posner stressed: “My thesis is that 
concepts of fault or blame, at least when understood in moral terms 
rather than translated into economic or other practical terms, are not 
useful addenda to the doctrines of contract law.”293 
It can, of course, be argued that fault should be required in both fields 
of law. Following such argument to its logical conclusion, it is possible that 
a given behavior would justify awarding relief under contract law and, at 
the same time, constitute a tort. And indeed, current tort law addresses 
stress, even recognizing it as a tort when one is evidently causing the stress 
of another.294 However, even if fault may appear in both fields of law, it 
does not mean that it should appear in both of them. In this context, note 
that placing a tort-like goal in contracts has more than theoretical 
consequences. Because a fault-based system must ensure that the action 
discouraged is improper enough to justify legal intervention, the bar for 
fault is raised. While a high bar might be appropriate under a tort regime 
where fault is often followed by heavy damages, it may be more 
problematic to adopt contractual high standard of fault when the risk is 
limited to the invalidation of the contract. The end result of elevating the 
fault bar is dangerous: Courts may approve and legitimize the vice of 
taking advantage of another’s vulnerability. They may find, as one court 
bluntly put it, that the “assertion of duress requires more than that a 
 
 290. Selmer Co. v. Blakeslee-Midwest Co., 704 F.2d 924, 928 (7th Cir. 1983). 
 291. See generally Roy Kreitner, Fault at the Contract-Tort Interface, 107 Mich. L. Rev. 1533, 1539–
41 (2009) (describing the shift in the modernization of contract law from a fault-based regime to a no-
fault, privatized regime). 
 292. Symposium, Fault in American Contract Law, 107 Mich. L. Rev. 1341 (2009). 
 293. Richard A. Posner, Let Us Never Blame a Contract Breaker, 107 Mich. L. Rev. 1349, 1349 
(2009) (emphasis added). Posner attributed his thesis to Holmes. Id. (“I have borrowed this thesis 
from Holmes, who . . . drew a sharp distinction between tort and contract law, so far as issues of fault 
or blameworthiness are concerned.”). 
 294. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46 (1965). Remarkably, the comments to the 
Restatement of Torts suggest that the legal understanding of what is referred to as “emotional 
distress” is far from being fully developed. Id. cmt. c. So much so that a caveat was added stating, “The 
Institute expresses no opinion as to whether there may not be other circumstances under which the 
actor may be subject to liability for the intentional or reckless infliction of emotional distress.” Id. 
(caveat). Following the above caveat, comment c states, “The law is still in a stage of development, and 
the ultimate limits of this tort are not yet determined.” Id. cmt. c.  
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party took advantage of another’s negative economic situation.”295 For all 
those reasons combined, subjecting the contractual relief to a high 
standard of fault seems questionable.296 
I would argue further that any consideration of fault should stem 
from the contractual structure of the dilemma: the need to balance the 
interests of the party seeking relief and the party who stands to lose a 
desirable contract if relief is awarded. Conditioning the relief to the 
distressed party on the presence of some fault of the unstressed party can 
thus be seen as merely balancing their opposing interests. This balancing 
does not call for a high level of fault. The goal of assessing the behavior 
of the party seeking enforcement is not to deter, educate, or punish that 
party, but rather to satisfy fairness concerns—that is, to make sure that 
awarding relief would not cause injustice. Thus, even modestly flawed 
behavior should suffice to award relief to a severely distressed party. 
Because a balancing justification is more plausible, the integration 
challenge is to demonstrate how the study of stress can help in 
reconceptualizing the kind of fault that might justify relief. First, we are 
now more able to recognize that stress is almost never caused by one 
factor or one person; instead, we usually witness clusters of stressors and 
a resulting distress that has several different causes. Therefore, it is futile 
to require, as many courts do, that the party seeking enforcement be the 
main cause of the vulnerability of the party seeking relief. In reality, 
posing such a high bar of fault simply works to defeat the distressed 
party, even when some fault of the other party is evident. Such was 
clearly the situation in Gascho. Since Mary Ann was not only under the 
stress of losing her job, but was also going through a painful and violent 
divorce, her employer, the party seeking enforcement, could not have 
been, by definition, the main cause of her stress. 
Second, and more significantly, the study of stress teaches us that 
stress—especially as it so often works in conjunction with depression and 
insomnia—is highly visible and frequently has many physical 
manifestations such as crying episodes, irritability, extreme weight 
changes, dependence on medical treatments, and daily use of medications. 
All those clear signs of vulnerability strongly suggest that at least some 
level of fault is almost always present in cases of consenting under stress. 
Such a basic level of fault originates from the awareness of one party that 
 
 295. Storie v. Household Int’l, Inc., No. 03-40268, 2005 WL 3728718, at *5 (D. Mass. Sept. 22, 
2005) (emphasis added). 
 296. This is not to suggest that there are no “pockets of fault” in contract law. For a description of 
some, see the articles mentioned in Omri Ben-Shahar & Ariel Porat, Fault in American Contract Law, 
107 Mich. L. Rev. 1341, 1342 (2009) (describing contributions by Melvin Eisenberg, Richard Epstein, 
and George Cohen). However, the authors summarize the entire symposium, stating that “even after 
highlighting the many faces of fault in contract law, it is all the more clear that the role of fault is 
limited.” Id. at 1344. 
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the other is operating under significant stress, and that awareness is 
followed by a decision to ignore the palpable signs of distress and move 
the deal to completion. 
The idea can be illustrated by revisiting Gascho. The hospital did not 
cause Mary Ann’s divorce, but it strongly encouraged her to sign a release 
agreement, while understanding the precariousness of her condition and 
denying her time to recover.297 In fact, the representatives of the hospital 
who personally negotiated with Mary Ann admitted knowing everything 
about her difficult situation—the bruises on her body, her major loss of 
weight, her severe depression, her insomnia, her medications, and her 
constant weeping during the closure of the agreement.298 The hospital’s 
awareness, combined with its determination to proceed with the 
contractual process, should have together represented a clear willingness 
to take advantage of Mary Ann’s vulnerability. 
In most cases, however, the party seeking to enforce the contract is 
at a higher level of fault and is more involved in exacerbating the stress—
even if it cannot be blamed for initially causing it. Parties showing this 
type of opportunistic behavior are not only aware of the stress of the 
other but are actively adding to it by pressuring their distressed 
counterparty. They sometimes do so by creating time pressure, rushing 
the other party to give consent or suffer the consequences. This is a 
recurrent story, for example, in the context of prenuptial agreements, 
when brides-to-be are put in the dilemma of accepting an unfair prenuptial 
agreement or facing a last-minute cancellation of their wedding. Similar 
time pressures are imposed in the lending process, where distraught 
borrowers are told by potential lenders that they have only a limited time 
to agree to a refinancing agreement before foreclosure will be initiated.299 
Stress studies, as we have seen, demonstrate that time pressure has the 
ability to aggravate significantly any given set of stressors.300 Beyond 
creating time pressure, other examples of fault—in the form of 
worsening the initial stress and enhancing the vulnerability—include 
creating an intimidating setting before or during the closure of the deal, 
overstating the harsh consequences of not signing the contract, and 
threatening legal actions. In one case, for example, a lender was aware of 
the borrower’s desperate condition, which included the recent death of her 
 
 297.  Gascho v. Scheurer Hosp., No. 08-10955-BC, 2009 WL 2222872, at *2 (E.D. Mich. July 23, 2009). 
 298.  Id. 
 299. For a vivid description of the impact of time pressure in this lending context, see In re Davis, 
169 B.R. 285, 290, 297 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1994) (“Everything was done so fast, sign this, sign this. The 
title man was there. He had a six o’clock appointment it was his son’s birthday and he was rushing and 
I was questioning this thing because I really didn’t want to do it. They kept on pushing me and pushing 
me and saying this and that.”). 
 300. Many stress-sensitive courts intuitively respond to the impact of time pressure. See, e.g., 
Holler v. Holler, 612 S.E.2d 469, 475–76 (S.C. Ct. App. 2005). (“Husband made it perfectly clear to 
Wife that she must sign the agreement if she wanted to be married prior to the expiration of her visa.”). 
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husband followed by a diagnosis of “severe depression and diabetes.”301 
The lender then added pressure in order to obtain the borrower’s consent 
to a refinancing agreement she could not afford, warning her that she has 
to act or the lender “will have to take other action.”302 
To a large extent, fault is tied to stress because of its fundamentally 
seductive quality. Being so evident and extreme, stress seems to entice 
exploitation because it presents an easy opportunity to make extra 
profit—profit not possible under normal conditions. Sadly, for too many 
players in the market, this temptation is hard to resist. Problematically, 
courts that fail to define the act of taking advantage as sufficient fault not 
only allow such behavior but also reward it. 
To conclude, the kind of fault that should be required as a condition 
for relief should be changed to include all the cases in which the party 
seeking enforcement knew or should have known about the stress. Due 
to the characteristic visibility of stress and its outcomes, a state of true 
innocence is, at best, rare. Indeed, in the many cases discussed in this 
Article, no party argued that they failed to notice the stress of the party 
seeking relief.303 Therefore, each time the party seeking relief is able to 
prove its distress at the time of consent, relief should not be denied based 
on no-fault arguments unless the party seeking enforcement can show 
innocence—that is, that there were no signs of severe stress and that it 
did not and should have not known about the other’s vulnerability.304 No 
party to a contract has a valid expectation for social support—by way of 
judicial enforcement—when it was involved in exploiting distress, such as 
when a party obtains consent from someone who is shaking and crying. 
The proposed broadening of the concept of fault from causing stress to 
being aware of it can be supported by the need to protect individuals, and 
the market as a whole, from exploitative behavior.305 Finally, what I suggest 
 
 301. Beneficial Mortg. Co. of Ohio v. Leach, No. 01AP-737, 2002 WL 926759, at *6 (Ohio Ct. App. 
May 9, 2002). 
 302. Id. Although the court did not find such exploitative behavior as satisfying the requirements 
of the duress doctrine, it did find the facts justified a hearing with regard to possible unconscionability. 
There is a conceptual damage, however, in thinking and declaring that there is not enough wrong in 
taking advantage of others. Also, in many other cases the analysis of “not-enough-fault” leads to total 
rejection of the stress argument. See, e.g., Storie v. Household Int’l, Inc., No. 03-40268, 2005 WL 
3728718, at*9 (D. Mass. Sept. 22, 2005). 
 303. However, the possibility exists, as one can imagine, that some individuals might conceal their 
stress during the negotiation to avoid exploitation of their vulnerability. 
 304. Compare this to the defense of unilateral mistake, Restatement (Second) of Contracts 
§ 153 cmt. a (1981) (“[R]elief has been granted where the other party actually knew or had reason to 
know of the mistake at the time the contract was made or where his fault caused the mistake.” 
(citation omitted)). 
 305. See, e.g., Rich & Whillock, Inc. v. Ashton Dev., Inc., 204 Cal. Rptr. 86, 90 (Cal. App. 1984) 
(“Those rules are not limited to precepts of rationality and self-interest. They include equitable 
notions of fairness and propriety which preclude the wrongful exploitation of business exigencies to 
obtain disproportionate exchanges of value. Such exchanges make a mockery of freedom of contract 
and undermine the proper functioning of our economic system.” (emphasis added)); Spencer Nathan 
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can also be explained in terms of risk allocation: Taking advantage of 
perceptible stress in order to win a contractual windfall can be seen as 
taking a calculated risk that the distressed party may later on, typically 
after some recovery, seek relief. It is, therefore, within the judicial role, 
and in fact a judicial duty, to do justice in those situations by appropriately 
balancing the parties’ interests. 
 3. Stress and the Objective/Subjective Dichotomy 
As we have seen, the fault requirement is not the only obstacle to 
those who seek a remedy for consenting under stress. They are often 
judged for surrendering to “subjective” feelings rather than utilizing 
“objectively” available alternatives. A prime example appears in Satter, 
in which the court stated: 
When Satter states that she suffered anxiety, depression, and an 
inability to sleep or be alone, she is speaking about things she 
subjectively felt and experienced. . . . [T]he Court’s duty is to decide 
whether a reasonable person in Satter’s position . . . would have felt 
forced to resign. Such an objective standard does not take into account 
the things Satter was subjectively feeling or experiencing 
emotionally . . . .306 
Despite those clear words, the objective/subjective dichotomy is 
highly inappropriate if one understands how stress operates. Integrating 
that knowledge into legal analysis produces several important conclusions. 
First, stress is not dominantly subjective but rather a common and 
patterned factual phenomenon, as suggested by the host of inventories of 
common stressors and recognized outcomes of stress. Even if stressors 
impact individuals differently, it is not mainly due to their unique 
emotional fabric, but is usually a result of other objective factors, such as 
other existing stressors, their social status, and/or the resources available 
to them. Furthermore, since stress is visible, measurable, and provable, it 
can be described as objective rather than subjective. Many distressed 
parties show evident physical signs of severe stress—such as crying and 
shaking while giving their consent307—and/or present clear professional 
 
Thal, The Inequality of Bargaining Power Doctrine: The Problem of Defining Contractual Unfairness, 
8 Oxford J. Legal Stud. 17, 22 (1988) (“[F]reedom of contract doctrine should not be accepted as a 
validating principle for contracts which arise as a result of exploitation. . . . [T]he most significant 
problem . . . is . . . formulating a coherent definition of exploitation. Such a definition is essential in 
order to maintain the limited nature of the claim.”). 
 306. Satter v. Wash. State Dep’t of Ecology, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 80520, at *6 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 
10, 2010). For a case using similar juxtaposition, see Middleton v. Dep’t of Def., 185 F.3d 1374, 1379 
(Fed. Cir. 1999) (“This test is an objective, rather than subjective one; an employee’s subjective feelings 
are irrelevant.” (emphasis added)); Christie v. United States, 518 F.2d 584, 587 (Ct. Cl. 1975) (“Duress 
is not measured by the employee’s subjective evaluation of a situation. Rather, the test is an objective 
one.” (emphasis added)). 
 307. McDevitt v. Guenther, 522 F. Supp. 2d 1272, 1278 (D. Haw. 2007) (a bride-to-be signing a 
harsh prenuptial agreement, in front of a notary, while crying, shaking and vomiting). 
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evidence of their distressed condition.308 Their stress exists objectively 
and should be evaluated accordingly. 
Second, similar to the way in which stress is not merely subjective, 
the reasonable alternative test is not purely an objective test. The 
alternatives imagined in retrospect by judges are often not available to a 
distressed party who is under pressure to give consent or suffer severe 
consequences. It is doubtful, for example, whether a bride-to-be, just a few 
days before her wedding, can see (or should see) the alternative of 
cancelling her wedding at the last minute as a viable alternative. Although 
such an alternative may seem reasonable to a judge who looks at the 
situation years after the signing of the prenuptial agreement, such a view is 
not more objective than the bride’s perspective at the time of signing.309 
More generally, judges often point to possible forms of action that are 
heavily influenced by their own (subjective) combinations of capabilities, 
resources, resilience, and calm. Consequently, they frequently end up 
recommending litigation as a reasonable alternative, without taking into 
account the demanding and intimidating nature of the process—especially 
for lay people overwhelmed by stress. Additionally, and more critically, as 
the alternatives study has shown,310 the scanning of alternatives by persons 
under stress is different than the scanning of alternatives by unstressed 
people—a fact that needs to be taken into account. 
If stress is not a subjective feeling and the alternatives are not so 
objective, it is essential to eliminate such rhetoric as—due to lingering 
legal aversion to subjectivity and resistance to arguments based on 
emotions311—it leaves little chance for appropriate treatment of the 
problem. The “reasonable alternative” test should therefore be refined 
to better reflect the science of stress, which shows that distressed parties 
have limited reasonable alternatives. 
B. Framework for Taking Stress into Account 
As I have argued thus far, taking stress into account is not only 
highly important, it is also attainable. Critically and perhaps surprisingly, 
it would require little change of doctrine. Once the veil of “subjective 
feeling” is removed and the focus is shifted from the fault of the party 
 
 308. Gascho v. Scheurer Hosp., 400 F. App’x 978, 980 (6th Cir. 2010) (introducing a detailed 
psychiatric report confirming major depression from the day that followed the signing of the contract). 
 309. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Spiegel, 553 N.W.2d 309, 318 (Iowa 1996) (“Here, Sara had a 
reasonable alternative—she could have canceled the wedding. Although she may have suffered 
embarrassment in doing so, we do not think social embarrassment from the cancellation of wedding 
plans, even on the eve of the wedding, renders that choice unreasonable.”). 
 310. Keinan, supra note 235, at 643. For a discussion of Keinan’s work in the context of the recent 
subprime crisis, see Lauren E. Willis, Decisionmaking and the Limits of Disclosure: The Problem of 
Predatory Lending: Price, 65 Md. L. Rev. 707, 769–71 (2006). 
 311. See, e.g., Abrams & Keren, supra note 88, at 1998. 
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seeking enforcement to the quality of consent of the party seeking relief, 
the challenge is almost fully met. Courts and practitioners can use the 
knowledge accumulated in years of research to evaluate stress arguments 
and in appropriate cases—when stress has led to an unfair contract—to 
prevent the exploitation of distressed parties.312 One stress-sensitive 
starting point may come from Europe, where the principles of contract law 
include an explicit ban on exploiting or profiting from the vulnerability of 
others.313 Next, I suggest that a stress-sensitive approach will build on the 
intuitive reasoning of stress-sensitive case law and augment that reasoning 
with considerations informed by the study of stress. Within this suggested 
stress-sensitive framework, four elements deserve special attention: the 
existence of scientifically acknowledged common stressors, the presence 
of factors creating special vulnerability, the manifestation of recognized 
symptoms, and the question of alternatives to contractual consent for a 
distressed person. 
 1. Common Stressors 
A stress argument relies on a stressor that allegedly had caused the 
stress. The inventories described in Part II allow an evaluation of the 
alleged stressor: The more recognizable and severe the stressor is 
considered by stress specialists, the more credibility should be given to the 
stress argument. This Article highlights three contractual contexts in which 
the agreements are made in an environment that is loaded with common 
and acknowledged stressors. First, in the employment setting, employees 
consenting to resign and release their employers from liability are often 
doing so under special stressful circumstances.314 However, even without 
additional misfortunes, the instability at the workplace and the 
anticipation of a job loss are recognized significant stressors. Second, 
contracts between borrowers and lenders are frequently made under 
 
 312. To prevent such exploitation, any of the existing doctrines of unconscionability, undue influence 
and/or duress may be used, and/or an expanded duty to negotiate in good faith can be adopted. 
Comparing the doctrines and choosing between them goes beyond the purpose and scope of this Article, 
given its focus on the problem of stress. However, others have discussed the similarities and differences 
between those doctrines. See, e.g., John Phillips, Protecting Those in a Disadvantageous Negotiating 
Position: Unconscionable Bargains as a Unifying Doctrine, 45 Wake Forest L. Rev. 837 (2010). 
 313. Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Role of Fault in Contract Law: Unconscionability, Unexpected 
Circumstances, Interpretation, Mistake, and Nonperformance, 107 Mich. L. Rev. 1413, 1418 (2009) (citing 
the Principles of European Contract Law, which provide: “A party may avoid a contract if, at the time of 
the conclusion of the contract: (a) it was . . . in economic distress or had urgent needs, was improvident, 
ignorant, inexperienced or lacking in bargaining skill, and (b) the other party knew or ought to have 
known of this and, given the circumstances and purpose of the contract, took advantage of the first party’s 
situation in a way which was grossly unfair or took an excessive benefit.” (emphasis added)). 
 314. Recall, for example, the sexual harassment suffered by Ms. Meyers, Meyers v. Trugreen, Inc., 
No. 03 C 7570, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9200 (N.D. Ill. May 21, 2004), and the hostile environment that 
had developed in the hospital that employed Ms. Gascho, Gascho v. Scheurer Hosp., 400 F. App’x 978, 
979–80 (6th Cir. 2010). 
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conditions related to the accepted stressor of financial strains. And third, 
in the intimate sphere, settlements between life-partners—either before 
the marriage or as part of a divorce process—are also made in connection 
with life-changing events that rank high on inventories of stressors. Other 
stress arguments can be concretely judged by a relatively simple review 
of the stress literature, which can assist in distinguishing situations that 
are acknowledged for their likelihood to produce stress from those which 
are less familiar or plausible. 
 2. Special Vulnerability Issues 
In constructing or evaluating a stress argument, special attention 
should be given not only to commonalities between people, but also to 
factors that make them differ in their response to stressful events. Thus, 
individual and social factors that tend to enhance or decrease the level of 
stress should be taken into account. Starting from the individual level, 
courts should evaluate any argument contextually to assess the significance 
of the leading stressor for the person before them. Additionally, the 
primary stressor in each case should not be reviewed in isolation; rather, 
clustering of stressors and the tendency of stressors to proliferate should 
be considered, and other existing stressors should be defined as well. 
Holler,315 for example, demonstrates the way that a fear of a last-minute 
wedding cancellation combines with the challenges of pregnancy, 
unemployment, and an immigrant visa that is about to expire. Still at the 
individual level, the material and mental resources available for coping 
with “universal,” or objective, stressors should play an essential role in 
the evaluation of the magnitude of the stress. As we have seen, abundant 
resources make it easier to cope while exhausted reserves may escalate 
the initial problem. 
Beyond the individual level, appreciation of what theorists have 
called “the social distribution of stress” necessitates sensitivity to the role 
of race, gender, and social status. For example, the fact that women are 
influenced more than men by interpersonal stressors should add credibility 
to a stress argument made by women who have given consent in the course 
of a difficult divorce process. To take another example, research has 
demonstrated that every step down the ladder of socioeconomic status 
produces more stress, as less control allows less room for coping.316 
Integrating this piece of information into the analysis can justify, for 
example, the intuitive result of the stress-sensitive Meyers decision.317 
Meyers’ stress argument gains power if we bear in mind her low status as 
a young sales associate who was sexually harassed by a series of senior 
 
 315. Holler v. Holler, 612 S.E.2d 469, 475–76 (S.C. Ct. App. 2005). 
 316. See supra notes 195–196 and accompanying text. 
 317. Meyers, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9200 at *17. 
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male managers. Moreover, in addition to special factors affecting 
individuals and social differences, some concrete circumstances should be 
considered relevant. For example, time pressure has been consistently 
shown to aggravate stress, a fact that has been intuitively recognized by 
some stress-sensitive courts.318 
 3. Recognizable Symptoms 
As we have seen, stressors trigger a secretion of special hormones in 
the brain, and those eventually create recognizable symptoms of stress 
such as insomnia, depression, and change in body weight. These symptoms 
can assist in evaluating the credibility of a given stress argument and can 
alleviate the fear of manipulation that comes from conceptualizing stress 
as merely a feeling. Importantly, recognizing the chemical cortisol 
connection between stress, insomnia, and depression makes it crucial 
that legal actors, from lawyers to judges, take greater cognizance of 
medical evidence. A psychiatric report that proves major depression and 
is not disputed by the other party, for example, cannot remain irrelevant 
to courts that care about quality of consent; the same goes for evidence 
regarding use of prescribed medications to relieve stress symptoms.319 
 4. Reasonable Alternatives 
Any consideration of reasonable alternatives must reflect the way 
that stress limits the ability to perceive alternatives and impairs the 
competence to choose reasonably among those perceived as available. A 
stress-sensitive analysis would take these insights into account and re-focus 
the question of alternatives. If the stress argument is plausible, under the 
first three elements, the question should be whether it was reasonable for 
a person under such stress to consent to an undesirable contract. The 
burden of showing that another alternative was visible and viable for the 
person under stress should accordingly shift to the party seeking to 
enforce the contract. 
Conclusion 
These four elements suggest a framework for an informed 
evaluation of stress arguments that brings non-legal knowledge to an 
important and familiar legal question—the question of consenting under 
stress. Unfortunately, with the current deep recession and its 
 
 318. Id. at *15 (stating that the situation became more acute because Meyers had only three days 
to deliberate). 
 319. For an example of courts’ disregard of medical evidence, see Gascho, 400 F. App’x at 980; 
Satter v. Wash. State Dep’t of Ecology, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 80520 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 10, 2010); see 
also Coleman v. Coleman, 681 P.2d 1269, 1270 (Utah 1984) (rejecting a stress argument despite a 
physician’s testimony that described the distressed party as “very depressed,” incapable of making 
important decisions, and using prescribed tranquilizers and antidepressants). 
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consequences, the question is especially relevant and requires immediate 
attention. So far, most legal actors have fallen short in fully coping with 
this issue. However, as I have argued here, law cannot afford to remain 
coldly doctrinal and isolated from other bodies of knowledge. An 
isolated, insensitive legal response to stress could become another major 
stressor in people’s lives, exacerbating rather than mitigating problems of 
exploitation. 
I am not the first to suggest that exploiting others’ vulnerability is or 
should be unacceptable under contract law.320 However, this Article is 
now contributing a studied explanation of why it is not only justified but 
also important, and quite urgent, to do so. To the legal arena it offers the 
first account of how stress can impair consent, even where that stress is 
not caused by the other party. It also provides a counterargument to 
Posner’s fault approach, which permits the exploitation of vulnerability 
as an acceptable contractual practice. With the study of stress gradually 
illuminating the scope of the problem and its dire consequences to 
individuals, communities, and society at large, law cannot afford to 
remain behind. In the face of stressful life circumstances, the law can 
offer relief by outlawing the exploitation of stress and vulnerability. It is 
incumbent on legal actors to take this path. 
In the field of contract law, the long interdisciplinary journey 
charted here leads to a relatively simple, practical conclusion. A more 
responsive contract law must attend more carefully to the quality of 
consent as a condition for contractual validity. Deploying the four basic 
elements outlined above, existing fairness-oriented doctrines—such as 
duress or unconscionability—can be used to protect those whose consent 
was impaired by stress. In fact, some stress-sensitive courts are already 
showing protective inclinations, and this Article offers a research-based 
justification for their decisions. 
Theoretically, however, the insight reflected in this Article extends 
far beyond the contractual arena. Consent given under stress presents a 
legal problem in a host of legal fields, both substantial and procedural. 
People may consent under stress to have sex (criminal law), to have 
children (family law), to go through medical procedures (health law), to 
use arbitration or mediation (civil procedure), to sign a plea bargain 
(criminal procedure), and so forth. In all those matters, and others, the law 
can benefit by understanding the operation and effects of stress and by 
accounting for it in the analysis of consent. This Article offers a path 
toward that goal. 
 
 320. See, e.g., John P. Dawson, Economic Duress—An Essay in Perspective, 45 Mich. L. Rev. 253, 
288–90 (1947) (famously arguing that the duress doctrine was based on the principle of prevention of 
excessive gain resulting from exploitation of impaired bargaining power); see also Alan Wertheimer, 
Exploitation 37–76 (1996) (arguing that cases in which relief was given under the doctrine of 
unconscionability often can be explained by the existence of exploitation). 
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